An Approach to Near Field Data Selection in Radio Frequency Identification by Winkworth, Robert D.
Purdue University
Purdue e-Pubs
Open Access Dissertations Theses and Dissertations
January 2015




Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for
additional information.
Recommended Citation
Winkworth, Robert D., "An Approach to Near Field Data Selection in Radio Frequency Identification" (2015). Open Access
Dissertations. 1158.
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/open_access_dissertations/1158





This is to certify that the thesis/dissertation prepared 
By  
Entitled 
For the degree of 
Is approved by the final examining committee: 
To the best of my knowledge and as understood by the student in the Thesis/Dissertation  
Agreement, Publication Delay, and Certification Disclaimer (Graduate School Form 32), 
this thesis/dissertation adheres to the provisions of Purdue University’s “Policy of  
Integrity in Research” and the use of copyright material. 
Approved by Major Professor(s): 
Approved by: 
   Head of the Departmental Graduate Program     Date 
Robert D. Winkworth







   
Marcus K. Rogers
Michael J. Dyrenfurth
Kathryne A. Newton 10/7/2015
AN APPROACH TO NEAR FIELD DATA SELECTION 
IN RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION 
 
A Dissertation 




Robert D. Winkworth 
 
In Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree 
of 











Research was made possible by support from sponsors including the Center for Education 
and Research in Information Assurance and Security. Recognized as the nation's 
preeminent facility of its kind, CERIAS continues to empower graduates including the 
author with computing resources, lab space, library collections, funding, and above all, 
the opportunity to collaborate with renowned industry and academic experts. 
 
To have the center's founder as a member of the doctoral committee reviewing this 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
GLOSSARY ...................................................................................................................... ix 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... xvi 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Problem Statement .................................................................................................... 5 
1.3 Purpose of Study ....................................................................................................... 5 
1.4 Research Questions ................................................................................................... 6 
1.5 Significance of Study ................................................................................................ 6 
1.6 Delimitations ............................................................................................................. 7 
1.7 Research Flow ......................................................................................................... 11 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ....................................................................... 12 
2.1 Methods Used .......................................................................................................... 12 
2.1.1 General electronic journal search .................................................................. 13 
2.1.2 Targeted electronic journal search ................................................................. 13 
2.1.3 Electronic dissertation search ........................................................................ 13 
2.1.4 Professional newsletter recommendations ..................................................... 14 
2.1.5 Patent database search ................................................................................... 14 
2.2 Body of Literature ................................................................................................... 16 
2.2.1 Fundamental Concepts ................................................................................... 16 
2.2.2 Clarifying the Problem .................................................................................. 20 
2.2.3 A Call for Improvement ................................................................................. 22 
2.2.4 Inviting the Card Overlay Solution ................................................................ 24 






 2.2.4.2 Mechanism ................................................................................................ 29 
2.2.4.3 Prevention ................................................................................................. 29 
2.2.4.4 Empowerment ........................................................................................... 30 
2.2.4.5 Least Privilege .......................................................................................... 30 
 2.2.5 Design Factors ............................................................................................... 31 
2.2.5.1 Cost ........................................................................................................... 31 
2.2.5.2 Durability .................................................................................................. 32 
2.2.5.3 Size ........................................................................................................... 32 
2.2.5.4 Simplicity .................................................................................................. 33 
2.2.5.5 Familiarity ................................................................................................ 33 
2.3 Converging on the Topic ......................................................................................... 34 
2.4 Prior Works ............................................................................................................. 35 
CHAPTER 3. METHODS ............................................................................................. 36 
3.1 Design Objectives ................................................................................................... 36 
3.2 Experiment Design .................................................................................................. 39 
3.2.1 Test 1: Independence ..................................................................................... 39 
3.2.1.1 Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 40 
3.2.1.1.1 H0a ...................................................................................................... 40 
3.2.1.1.2 H1 ........................................................................................................ 40 
3.2.1.2 Variables ................................................................................................... 40 
3.2.1.3 Data Collection ......................................................................................... 41 
3.2.1.4 Statistical Analysis ................................................................................... 44 
3.2.2 Test 2: Reliability .......................................................................................... 44 
3.2.2.1 Hypotheses ................................................................................................ 46 
3.2.2.1.1 H0b ...................................................................................................... 46 
3.2.2.1.2 H2 ........................................................................................................ 46 
3.2.2.2 Variables ................................................................................................... 47 
3.2.2.3 Statistical Analysis ................................................................................... 49 






 3.2.3.1 Subjects ..................................................................................................... 49 
3.2.3.2 Instruments ............................................................................................... 49 
3.2.4 Laboratory Conditions ................................................................................... 52 
3.2.5 Testing Schedule ............................................................................................ 55 
3.3 Statistical Analyses ................................................................................................. 57 
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS ............................................................................................... 60 
4.1 Test 1: Independence ............................................................................................... 60 
4.1.1 Preliminary Testing Overview ....................................................................... 60 
4.1.2 Direct Effect Test Overview .......................................................................... 60 
4.1.3 Data ................................................................................................................ 61 
4.1.3.1 Preliminary Testing .................................................................................. 61 
4.1.3.2 Direct Effect Test ...................................................................................... 61 
4.1.4 Analysis ......................................................................................................... 62 
4.1.5 Outcome ......................................................................................................... 63 
4.1.6 Further Investigation ...................................................................................... 63 
4.2 Test 2: Reliability .................................................................................................... 64 
4.2.1 Preliminary Testing Overview ....................................................................... 64 
4.2.2 Direct Effect Test Overview .......................................................................... 64 
4.2.3 Data ................................................................................................................ 65 
4.2.4 Analysis ......................................................................................................... 65 
4.2.5 Outcome ......................................................................................................... 68 
4.2.6 Further Investigation ...................................................................................... 68 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................................... 70 
5.1 Research Question I ................................................................................................ 70 
5.2 Research Question II ............................................................................................... 70 
5.3 Discussion ............................................................................................................... 71 
5.3.1 A Review of the Testing Protocol ................................................................. 73 
5.3.2 Additional Laboratory Observations ............................................................. 77 






 5.4 Recommendations ................................................................................................... 78 
5.4.1 Concerning Technology Deployments .......................................................... 78 
5.4.1.1 Uniquely Identifying People ..................................................................... 78 
5.4.1.2 Large-Scale Applications ......................................................................... 79 
5.4.1.3 Ramifications of a Detuning Approach .................................................... 80 
5.4.2 Concerning Research and Development ........................................................ 82 
5.4.2.1 Linking Data Fields .................................................................................. 84 
5.4.2.2 Other Prospects ......................................................................................... 85 
5.5 Summary ................................................................................................................. 86 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 87 
APPENDIX ....................................................................................................................... 98 







LIST OF TABLES 
Table .............................................................................................................................. Page 
1 Preliminary Test I Data .................................................................................................. 61 
2 Direct Effect Test I Data ................................................................................................ 61 
3 Test for Independence of Data Fields ............................................................................ 62 
4 Alternative Test for Independence ................................................................................. 63 
5 Direct Effect Test II Data ............................................................................................... 65 
6 Binary Logistic Regression Test for Reliability ............................................................ 66 





LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure ............................................................................................................................. Page 
1 Popular RFID Tags in Various Shapes and Sizes .......................................................... 17 
2 Two Dominant RFID Tag Designs, with their Bands and Standards ............................ 18 
3 Near Field Wireless Coupling, as used in High Frequency Tags .................................. 19 
4 Commercial RFID Card ................................................................................................. 37 
5 Antenna Coil Pattern of Common RFID Cards ............................................................. 37 
6 Labeled Prototype Card Surface .................................................................................... 38 
7 Test I Experiment Flow ................................................................................................. 43 
8 Reduction Guide for the Overlay ................................................................................... 45 
9 Test II Experiment Flow ................................................................................................ 48 
10 Obscured Fields, and the Data Released ...................................................................... 50 
11 Card, Conveyor, and RFID Reader .............................................................................. 51 
12 Approximate Z-Test Statistic ....................................................................................... 58 






 Unless used otherwise in context, terms shall be defined as follows. Those 
definitions that conform to established industry or academic sources are drawn from the 
dictionaries cited. 
 
Active Tag: Tags that use batteries as a partial or complete source of 
power to boost the effective operating range of the tag and 
to offer additional features over passive tags (RFID 
Glossary, n.d.). 
 
AIDC: Automatic Identification and Data Capture - technologies 
including bar codes, smart media, biometrics, and RFID 
(RFID Glossary, n.d.). 
 
Antenna: That part of a transmitting or receiving system that is 
designed to radiate or to receive electromagnetic waves 
(Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, 
Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Backscatter: A method of communication between passive tags and 
readers. RFID tags using backscatter technology reflect 
back to the reader radio waves from a reader, usually at the 
same carrier frequency. The reflected signal is modulated 





Band: Range of frequency between two defined limits 
(Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, 
Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Capacitive: An electromagnetic signal transmission coupling mode that 
occurs in the near field from an antenna that preferentially 
emits electric field over magnetic field such as an electric 
dipole antenna (Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE 
Standards Terms, Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Coupling: The association of two or more circuits or systems in such a 
way that power or signal information may be transferred 
from one to another (Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE 
Standards Terms, Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Data Field: An ID card's smallest component of data entry and storage. 
 
Die: The silicon block onto which circuits have been etched to 
create a microchip (Glossary of RFID Terms, 2014). 
 
Dipole: A linear radiator, usually fed in the center, producing a 
maximum of radiation in the plane normal to its axis. The 
length specified is the overall length. Any one of a class of 
antennas producing the radiation pattern approximating that 
of an elementary electric dipole (Authoritative Dictionary 
of IEEE Standards Terms, Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Driven Element: A radiating element coupled directly to the feed line of an 
antenna (Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards 





Duty cycle: The percentage of time the reader is emitting energy 
(Glossary of RFID Terms, 2014). 
 
Dwell Time: The time a transit unit spends at a station or stop, measured 
as the interval between its stopping and starting 
(Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, 
Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Excitation: Charging of a passive tag by transmitting RF energy from a 
reader, to activate the tag and enable response (Glossary of 
RFID Terms, 2014). 
 
Far Field: A region in which the RF power delivered from an antenna 
decreases by the square of its distance from the antenna. A 
region where coupling is primarily electromagnetic 
(Glossary of RFID Terms, 2014). 
 
Feed Line: A transmission line interconnecting an antenna and a 
transmitter or receiver or both (Authoritative Dictionary of 
IEEE Standards Terms, Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Frequency: The number of periods of an oscillation or wave occurring 
in unit time of a periodic quantity, in which time is the 
independent variable (Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE 
Standards Terms, Seventh Edition,2007). 
 
Half Duplex: A communication channel capable of transmitting data in 
both directions, but not simultaneously (Glossary of RFID 





Hashing: A process of applying a mathematical algorithm against a 
set of data to produce a numeric value (a 'hash value') that 
represents the data (Glossary of Common Cybersecurity 
Terminology, n.d.). 
 
Induction: The process of generating time-varying voltages and/or 
currents in otherwise un-energized conductive objects or 
electric circuits by the influence of the time-varying electric 
and/or magnetic fields (Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE 
Standards Terms, Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Insulation: A material that has electrical insulating properties and is 
used to separate parts that have different voltages 
(Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, 
Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Isotropic: Having the same properties in all directions (Authoritative 
Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, Seventh Edition, 
2007). 
 
Key: The numerical value used to control cryptographic 
operations, such as decryption, encryption, signature 
generation, or signature verification (Glossary of Common 
Cybersecurity Terminology, n.d.). 
 
Lobe: A portion of the antenna directional pattern bounded by one 
or two cones of nulls (Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE 





Microcontroller: A processing device that has the capability needed to 
receive data from external devices, analog or digital or both, 
process the data according to preset algorithms or special 
computing techniques or both, and then provide the results 
to external devices for the end purpose of controlling the 
process (Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, 
Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Modulation: Alteration of a wave characteristic so that it may serve as a 
carrier of information. 
 
Near Field: The region of the field of an antenna between the reactive 
near field region and the far field region wherein radiation 
fields predominate and wherein the angular field 
distribution is dependent upon distance from the antenna 
(Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, 
Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Null: The direction between radiation lobes where the signal 
drops to a minimum. In general, a null is any portion of the 
pattern where the signal level is less than 10% of the RMS 
of the pattern (Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards 
Terms, Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Parasitic element: A radiating element that is not connected to the feed lines 
of an antenna and that materially affects the radiation 
pattern or impedance of an antenna, or both (Authoritative 







Passive Tag: The most common RFID tags, in which a reader transmits 
an energy field that "wakes up" the tag and provides the 
power for the tag to operate (RFID Glossary, n.d.). 
 
Permittivity: The ratio of electric flux density D to electric field strength 
E (Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, 
Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Polarization: That property of periodic electric or magnetic field 
describing the figure traced over one cycle by the extremity 
of the field vector at a fixed location in space (Authoritative 
Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, Seventh Edition, 
2007). 
 
Radome: A cover, usually intended for protecting an antenna from 
the effects of its physical environment without degrading 
its electrical performance (Authoritative Dictionary of 
IEEE Standards Terms, Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Reader: A wireless device that supplies modulated RF energy to 
passive tags and accepts a signal in reply, for the purpose of 
interrogating the tag for information. 
 
RF Field: RF electrical and magnetic fields emitted from 
antenna/transmitter arrays (Authoritative Dictionary of 
IEEE Standards Terms, Seventh Edition, 2007). 
 
Singulation: A means by which an RFID reader identifies a tag with a 
specific serial number from a number of tags in its field, 






Transponder: A tag incorporating a microchip and antenna that can be 
programmed with information to identify entities and 
transmit that information to a receiver (RFID Glossary, 
n.d.). 
 
Tuned: Adjusted for responsiveness to a target frequency. 
 
Tuple: A data type similar to a list, containing a set of values in 
which the same element may appear more than once. 
 
Wavelength: The distance along the direction of propagation of a 
periodic wave between two successive points where, at a 
given time, the phase is the same (Authoritative Dictionary 
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Personal identification is needed in many civil activities, and the common identification 
cards, such as a driver's license, have become the standard document de facto. Radio 
frequency identification has complicated this matter. Unlike their printed predecessors, 
contemporary RFID cards lack a practical way for users to control access to their 
individual fields of data. This leaves them more available to unauthorized parties, and 
more prone to abuse. Here, then was undertaken a means to test a novel RFID card 
technology that allows overlays to be used for reliable, reversible data access settings. 
Similar to other proposed switching mechanisms, it offers advantages that may greatly 
improve outcomes. RFID use is increasing in identity documents such as drivers' licenses 
and passports, and with it concern over the theft of personal information, which can 
enable unauthorized tracking or fraud. Effort put into designing a strong foundation 
technology now may allow for widespread development on them later. 
 
In this dissertation, such a technology was designed and constructed, to drive the central 
thesis that selective detuning could serve as a feasible, reliable mechanism. The concept 
had been illustrated effective in limiting access to all fields simultaneously before, and 
was here effective in limiting access to specific fields selectively. A novel card was 
produced in familiar dimensions, with an intuitive interface by which users may conceal 
the visible print of the card to conceal the wireless emissions it allows. A discussion was 
included of similar technologies, involving capacitive switching, that could further 






The card prototype was put to a battery of laboratory tests to measure the degree of 
independence between data fields and the reliability of the switching mechanism when 
used under realistically variable coverage, demonstrating statistically consistent 
performance in both. The success rate of RFID card read operations, which are already 
greater than 99.9%, were exceeded by the success rate of selection using the featured 
technology. With controls in place for the most influential factors related to card 
readability (namely the distance from the reader antennas and the orientation of the card 
antenna with respect to them), the card was shown to completely resist data acquisition 
from unauthorized fields while allowing unimpeded access to authorized fields, even 
after thousands of varied attempts. The effect was proven to be temporary and reversible. 
User intervention allowed for the switching to occur in a matter of seconds by sliding a 
conductive sleeve or applying tape to regions of the card. 
 
Strategies for widespread implementation were discussed, emphasizing factors that 
included cost, durability, size, simplicity, and familiarity, all of which arise in card 
management decisions for common state and national identification such as a driver's 
license. The relationship between the card and external database systems was detailed, as 
no such identification document could function in isolation. A practical solution 
involving it will include details of how multiple fields will be written to the card and 
separated sufficiently in external databases so as to allow for user-directed selection of 
data field disclosure. Opportunities for implementation in corporate and academic 






CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 
 The ability to uniquely identify people is vital to contemporary life, defining not 
only the limits of privilege or affiliation, but also the very relationship between citizen 
and state (Clement, McPhail, Smith, & Ferenbok, 2012). For long, the most common 
method of formal identification in the United States has been the driver’s license or 
similar state-issued identification card, but with the advent of Radio Frequency 
Identification--RFID--there is new interest in replacing these methods with devices 
capable of wirelessly determining a user’s identity using small, programmable chips with 
onboard signaling components (Marquardt, Taylor, Villar, & Greenberg, 2010). Such 
chips have been used widely in manufacturing, distribution, and sales applications, and 
then began to appear in forms of government-issued personal identification such as 
driver's licenses and passports (Gertz, 2008). The technology employed makes possible 
greater efficiency and greater flexibility than was possible with printed, optical, and 
magnetic cards; but it does not currently allow for the same protections against 
unauthorized disclosure of personal information (Phillips, Karygiannis, & Kuhn, 2005). 
 
 A driver’s license and most other such cards contain a photograph of the intended 
user and several fields of information such as name, age, gender, etc. Until now, if a user 
was called upon to provide proof of identity using a photographic ID card, it was a minor 
matter to withhold fields as desired. Proof of the user’s name with respect to the 
photograph, for example, could be made by displaying or optically scanning a copy of the 
card, exposing the name and photograph, but obscuring the remaining fields with an 





fields while obscuring the rest, and many other combinations are possible. The user 
retains control over the extent of the disclosure in these cases; no more or less is revealed 
than is necessary to perform the intended test (Clement et al., 2012). 
 
 If, however, the printed card is replaced with the type of wireless chip now used 
in identification documents such as passports, there is no such means for selection. 
Provided normal operating conditions, the chip’s entire contents are disclosed to any 
authenticated RFID reader within range (Mahmood & Al-Hamdani, 2011). This means 
that, for example, an airport traveler who intended to present one passport page would be 
forced to share his entire travel history whenever he so much as opened his passport. 
Likewise, a consumer that wished to prove his name or age would also be forced to share 
any additional information on the RFID card used, without any forthright means to limit 
it. 
 
 As with other forms of identification, RFID needs, for a successful deployment, to 
take into account who and what retains custody of the information, what mechanism is 
used to release it, who shall be responsible for the decision, and how much information is 
really needed to complete the desired transaction. Printed identification cards used in 
combination with overlays and photocopying devices provide a means of limiting 
disclosure to only those portions of the card so needed. The number and combination of 
portions may be chosen in each transaction independently. When print gives way to 
automatic mechanisms, this choice may be lost. RFID is a prime example. 
 
 Radio-frequency identification cards complicate this matter in several ways. The 
fields are no longer visible on the card itself, and can no longer be obscured 
independently. The most a cardholder was originally able to do to prevent its information 
from being read (without causing physical damage) was shielding the entire card, or 






 One of the earliest measures taken to curb the threat of unauthorized scanning was 
to employ RF-opaque covers that could be used over the RFID document. US passports 
were among these (Lawson, 2008). A variety of these covers have been tested in this 
study's lab, and found to have an actual effectiveness against read attempts that does not 
always agree with advertised claims. Nonetheless, they do illustrate an important fact: the 
RFID component--specifically the antenna--is degraded noticeably when conductive 
materials are too close. This occurs both because a sufficiently conductive enclosure has 
a shielding effect on electromagnetic radiation, and because even open conductors of 
sufficient length will still cause detuning of the antenna, reducing its performance on the 
intended frequency band. Federal and state officials recommend the use of such covers on 
RFID passports and driver's license cards (Lewan, 2009). What they would need to 
provide granular selection, however, is a way to make opaque only certain, private data 
fields, while allowing for access to the rest. This is a flexibility not currently available in 
federal or state RFID models (Nogueira & Greis, 2009). 
 
 What the research of this dissertation demonstrated is a model that allows access 
to the fields to be toggled independently, using visible, intuitive methods and familiar 
card geometry, the sort found in current deployments to large state populations. RFID has 
been deployed in a number of cases where it had been billed as introducing new security, 
but actually introduced weaknesses, because it failed to adhere to the principles above 
(Lawson, 2008). What makes for an effective solution is not a technology alone, but the 
principles, however enacted. RFID provides a means to enact them readily, and is 
attractive not only because the devices are powerful, but also because they produce a 
palpable effect. Users have been shown more likely to adopt security mechanisms that 
make them feel safer rather than those that produce the same effects without any 
indicators that users can sense (Schneier, 2008). 
 
 As a practical matter, not all ID users are concerned about the unnecessary 
disclosure of personal information. For them, losing a protection that they were not using 





introduced as the replacement to another, such as printed cards, there arises cause for 
concern if the successor offers a lower functionality, or a higher vulnerability to abuse. 
Users might question whether it is, in all regards, an improvement over the current 
technology. They might discover, only when the new is established widely, that the old 
had offered unique utility, through features that cannot be easily reintroduced. This 
outcome seems likely in light of the common public lack of awareness of the security and 
privacy risks associated with RFID (Marqhardt et al., 2010). 
 
 Among the concerns that are known to arise among users is how identifying 
documents are used to commit acts of impersonation and fraud (Ramos, Scott, Lloyd, 
O'Leary, & Waldo, 2009). The popular term "identity theft" could be better phrased. 
Identity is not what is being taken in such cases; information is being taken, and used to 
misrepresent identity. Information need not be deleted from its original source, either, so 
rather than describing it as a theft, it might be more suitable to describe it as unauthorized 
access to personal information, or the unauthorized use of it (Abdullah, 2004). The real 
problem behind the abuses done with the information is that it is possible to conduct 
transactions using identifying information that is not legitimate. This is a matter 
fundamental to identification using any medium, but becomes particularly relevant when 
wireless technology is involved, with transactions that are both invisible and also able to 
happen without the user (or abuser) ever laying hand upon the ID document. 
 
 More than a few influential participants in the RFID industry have expressed 
concern over the decline in user control that comes with the new identification devices. 
For example, the head of wireless technology at Siemens has been an advocate of RFID 
for some time, noting its promise as an ID for patients in hospital, students in school, and 
consumers most anywhere. Yet, he tempers his enthusiasm with warnings of misuse if 
RFID is to be used for a widespread ID deployment. In short, "There needs to be 
standards put in place so the data is not abused for other purposes" (Herrmann, 2007, para. 





which personal information is released during RFID transactions. The only control is 
over whether the technology is used at all. 
 
 There has been work done to address the data release issue. Functional prototypes 
such as those demonstrated by Marqhardt et al. had mechanisms that did not allow read 
operations without physical confirmation from the user (2010). This included even the 
capability of separating data into two classifications--low-sensitivity and high-sensitivity. 
It allowed the user to release one of the two sets at a time by squeezing a button built into 
the card (p. 2312). What was proposed for the research of the content to follow is a 
separation of the data fields in the identification document so the relationships among any 
number of them may be revealed as needed, without involving the others. Without this 
level of granularity, the document remains an indivisible container of data, all of which is 
available for any transaction with any party, and disclosure of unnecessary personal data 
becomes inevitable. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
 The problem that first prompted study here was that unlike their printed 
predecessors, contemporary RFID cards lack a practical way for users to control access to 
their individual fields of data. This leaves them more available to unauthorized parties, 
and more prone to abuse. 
 
1.3 Purpose of Study 
 
 The study was undertaken to test a novel RFID card technology that allows 
overlays to be used for reliable, reversible data access settings. It drives the central thesis 
that an overlay based on RF detuning is possible. 
 
 This proposed card design allows for granular user discretion over the disclosure 





technological landscape. Proving it effective in a controlled environment invites work 
implementing the social and regulatory components of a complete personal identification 
solution. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
 
a) Is selective detuning a feasible mechanism for independent selection of RFID 
card data? 
b) Can a design for selective RFID detuning operate reliably enough to be practical? 
 
1.5 Significance of Study 
 
 Every passport issued in the US incorporates RFID technology. Come the year 
2017, it will be the only type accepted (Ramos et al., 2009). Public concern over "identity 
theft" continues to grow in the US (Abdullah, 2004), while these changes to government 
ID documents make unauthorized collection of information possible by methods that are 
faster, easier, and less noticeable than before (Lawson, 2008). Consumers who carry 
these documents may be tracked by the collected information, without their consent 
(Smith, 2010). 
 
 Effort put into designing strong foundation technologies now may allow for many 
decades of successful development on them later (Koscher, Juels, Kohno, & Brajkovic, 
2009). This dissertation analyzes principles fundamental to effective personal 
identification, and offers a solution on which further development may easily follow. The 
central aspect addressed here is the mechanism for controlling read and write access to 
data fields on ID cards. 
 
 In the US, a driver's license is used far beyond the purpose of proving licensure to 
drive. It has also been co-opted as a general identification document, and used to open a 





similar uses (p. 103), offering information that may be obtained even when the holder is 
not in fact passing a port or even approaching a national border. The large and established 
base of users makes the use of these documents inviting, but superior identification 
technologies exist, and are tailored to the specific requirements of personal government 
documents (Mahmood & Al-Hamdani, 2011). While it seems quite optimistic to think 
that an alternative to drivers' licenses and passports will be accepted and deployed as a 
replacement for either, this work nonetheless has the opportunity to address concerns that 
are present even today, and principles of identification that belong in any such 
mechanism. It is offered as the basis for future decisions. 
 
 Even within the category of RFID cards, there is found more than one approach to 
improving hardware privacy. Methods exist for making RFID tags unique, and resilient to 
counterfeiting, for example, (Periaswamy, Thompson, & Di, 2011), and there are several 
possible hardware-based mechanisms for data field selection (Marqhardt et al., 2010). 
This dissertation does not represent an exhaustive demonstration of all available 
technologies, or assert that one should be held above all others in every context. Rather, it 
represents a demonstration of one attractive mechanism that has shown potential, and 
meets or exceeds the demands in terms of reliability, affordability, durability, etc. This 




 The scope of this work shall include only radio-frequency cards used for 
identifying personnel. Many of the principles introduced would apply also beyond cards, 
to include buttons, anklets, stickers, implants, and other tag packages too numerous to 
deal with here. This could also extend easily to a discussion of identifying products, but 
volumes have already been written on that topic, while certain aspects of personnel 
identification still appear to need attention (Heim, 2008). Note that there are distinctions 
drawn between the printed cards and the RFID cards that would similarly apply between 





stripe cards and optical pattern cards. Separate strategies would be needed to provide 
selective disclosure in cards using these technologies, and they cannot be addressed 
within scope here. 
 
 The number of personal data fields directly available on an RFID document 
differs according to its application. In electronic passports, multiple fields exist, and 
duplicate much of the information in the printed fields. In electronic driver's license cards, 
a single field exists containing a unique identifier that in turn is used as a primary key to a 
tuple of user data stored externally in a government database (Nogueira & Greis, 2009). 
This paper presents new technology that could be readily used in either of these 
documents, but would replace the current designs. Neither this nor any advancement in 
ID can provide a higher degree of control over how its data are used in external 
documents or stores, beyond curtailing its initial disclosure. The technology presented 
here is for direct control of the document, and not remote control functions. 
 
 RFID is separate from biometric technology, but the two are frequently deployed 
together. If care is not exercised, the former can greatly weaken the security of the latter. 
(Williams, 2009). The research presented here operates from the standpoint that whatever 
biometric features might be included in an RFID deployment were collected and 
incorporated appropriately into the card in question before its examination began. A vital 
function of the card, then, is to see them safeguarded, and disclosed only when and where 
desired. One security researcher successfully forged an RFID card that would report him 
as Elvis Presley to electronic readers (Timmer, 2008). Stunts such as these cannot be 
prevented by selective disclosure. They require separate measures, which might be as 
simple as keeping a human attendant with good vision involved in the process, rather 
than allowing full automation with no attendant (Timmer, 2008). 
 
 The work presented here is for card technology carried in hand, pocket, purse, etc., 
and should not be construed to apply for RFID documents small enough to be carried 





come under greater legislative scrutiny (Greenblatt, 2010). Even before the discussion 
turns to the health concerns surrounding implantable devices, the very thought that they 
could become popular enough to be mentioned in employment requirements is enough to 
draw firm resistance from state representatives. Several states have passed legislation 
strictly curtailing involuntary RFID implants, anticipating possible abuses from 
employers and insurance companies (Kunkle & Helderman, 2010). Though guided by 
some principles that are not scientifically correct, these government figures have made it 
unlikely that a national standard for implanted identification could ever be imposed in the 
US. This matter shall not be explored further here. 
 
 Standards of identification used in countries other than the US are beyond scope 
of this paper as well, even though the findings from it might still prove applicable to what 
other countries need. State identification cards carry similar information in many 
countries, and share similar cost and durability requirements, so there is likely to be 
opportunity here for further regional study. The technology of ID has applications that are 
inviting in many national contexts; consider (Qaiser & Khan, 2006) or (Lehman, 2012). 
Points regarding identification outside the US shall be included where they illustrate 
general principles, but are distinguished from points of policy or government. 
 
 This paper presents a prototype RFID device and the tests of its ability to select 
for and against data disclosure. A mechanism is engineered and used to distinguish data 
fields with a metallic overlay. In later reproductions of this effect, it shall be considered 
beyond scope to include variation that might occur resulting from 
 Manufacturing defects 
 Lack of metal purity standards 
 Intentional tampering and misuse 
 Public RF sources in excess of FCC limits 
 
 The tests concern only the hardware mechanism and electrical principles of the 






offer or the automation process they might introduce to scale the manufacturing from the 
small quantity of prototype units up to a large quantity of commercial production units. 
 
 The detuning effects on high frequency tags are known to vary according to the 
antenna geometry used. They show predictably greater variation than is found in a card 
specifically designed for capacitive switching. This experiment and the numerical 
analyses to follow serve as an illustration of what is possible in mechanisms of selective 
disclosure, presented with the hope that others explore and optimize them to suit 
individual needs. 
 
 In brief, the mechanism at work in a capacitive design is slightly different than the 
detuning effect used here. It employs sensors that measure the overlay's permittivity--its 
willingness to allow an electric field to form through it. Inputs from these sensors are 
processed by the card's control circuitry during an attempted read operation, and instruct 
it to remain silent if the overlay is in place. In a laboratory setting, the effect on data field 
selection is the same for cards in both of these two categories, and for purposes of this 
experiment, either will do to demonstrate the principle. For future production, though, the 
capacitive design requires fewer parts, greater engineering flexibility, and even higher 
reliability when it comes to surface area of overlay coverage, so it represents a good 








1.7 Research Flow 
 
 The focus of this research could have been drawn to any one of several problems 
currently challenging radiofrequency identification, so it might be worthwhile to briefly 
describe the progression from general topics down into the specific factors tested: 
 
 The work presented here begins with the problem of controlling access to card 
regions. From this leads a path suitable for each of the two research questions, a & b. 
Each of these has a separate hypothesis, which was tested by its own suited methods. The 
collected data were analyzed separately according to the numerical tests chosen for the 
hypothesis. The result for each of the tests was recorded. The two results led to their 
respective conclusions, and to recommendations on selective detuning. From this come 
the recommendations for deployment of a personnel identification technology based on 
selective detuning, and recommendations for continuing research in it. 
 
 It is important to remember that while these two separate tracks of experimental 
testing are described here in sections of their own, they form the two vital supports of the 
final, unifying summary of the model and its prototype. Ultimately, this is research into 
the model. It was tested according to two crucial questions, and found effective. Only 
because of this was it seen as worthy of further consideration, and only because of this is 
it offered as one proposal for solving the stated problem of lost granular control over data 






CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Methods Used 
 
 It becomes clear early in an investigation of the literature that the RFID industry 
leaves many opportunities for security research and improvement. Entire volumes have 
been written on applications specific to warehousing, transportation, sales, and overall 
supply chain management, for example. Security in these matters is largely a matter of 
sustaining business and preventing sabotage, so most of its literature is not directly 
applicable to citizen identification. 
 
 Even when limited to personal devices worn and carried, the body of knowledge 
is huge, and increased even as this review proceeded, so it is not possible in any one 
paper to offer a comprehensive summary of what has been written. What follows is 
considered representative, highlighting the most salient points that would lead to 
opportunities for study, experiment, and development. 
 
 Though the breadth of literature available worldwide on the topic of RFID has 
grown explosively over the last few decades, it is not of consistent quality or credibility 
(Roberti, 2009). It has unsettled an establishment, as new technologies generally do. It 
has introduced possibilities that are not sharply limited. It relies upon physical principles 
that many consumers do not understand (Brookes, 2010). For these reasons, it is 
unsurprising that a portion of the material written overstates the abilities of RFID. A 
portion misunderstands the advantages. A portion misunderstands the risks. A portion is 
purely speculative, and lacks the testable basis to make empirical work meaningful 






 Literature for this review was collected by the following methods: 
 
2.1.1 General electronic journal search 
 
This found results from the journals indexed in the collective network of libraries 
cooperating with Purdue University (currently 7,634 journals). Searches were conducted 
of title, abstract, body, and bibliography by text strings as explained below, or by unique 
identifiers when a specific title had been recommended. 
 
2.1.2 Targeted electronic journal search 
 
This found results from top industry associations. Most prominent were the Association 
for Computing Machinery and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. 
 
A total of 23 journals from the ACM were consulted, including the SIGAPP Applied 
Computing Review, Data and Information Quality, Transactions on Computer-Human 
Interaction and proceedings of the Conference on Computer and Communications 
Security, International Workshop on Wireless Sensor Networks & Applications, and 
Workshop on Role Based Access Control. 
 
A total of 26 journals from the IEEE were consulted, including Wireless 
Communications, Security & Privacy, Embedded Systems Letters, and transactions on 
Antennas and Propagation, Electromagnetic Compatibility, Human Factors in Electronics, 
and Information Theory. 
 
2.1.3 Electronic dissertation search 
 
This covered material in graduate dissertation work that mentioned radio-frequency 






category, but it was useful in illustrating which methods were being attempted 
experimentally, and what sort of success they claimed. 
 
2.1.4 Professional newsletter recommendations 
 
This suggested books, articles, and proceedings that others working in RFID research 
found useful. Much of the search for literature relied upon references in well-known 
publications pointing the way to subtler ones. Many valuable insights came from work 
that has not yet been commercialized or shared beyond academic environments. 
 
2.1.5 Patent database search 
 
This revealed technologies that have already been submitted for government registration 
in the US. Innovators that are serious enough about their ideas to seek exclusive 
privileges in them deserve attention here. The proposed research is not appropriate if it 
has already been performed in the course of a patent application. 
 
The principle text strings used in searching by term in journals were 
 "RFID privacy" 
 "identification card" 
 "RFID" and "driver's license" 
 "RFID" and "operator license" 
 "RFID" and "selective" and "disclosure" and "field" and "data" 
 
 Material published earlier than the year 2000 was considered too old for inclusion. 
While some valuable ideas did appear in it, they became popular enough to be published 








 A subset of the results collected was selected according to the reputation of the 
authors and institutions with which their citations were associated. Where multiple 
sources described similar principles, a single source was selected as representative of the 
others. Material deemed redundant in established claims was excluded from the citations 
for the sake of bringing the list down to a manageable number. Thousands of results were 
initially returned, but only favored hundreds could be selected for detailed reading. 
Works cited by respected researchers were also explored for inclusion here. 
 
 Because broad commercial use of RFID has not been a topic of publication for 
more than a few decades, a publication on the topic is not considered outdated unless 
there is found a newer publication with content that clearly supersedes and replaces it. 
 
 Effects demonstrated publicly and made open to scrutiny were considered 
credible, regardless of where accounts of the demonstration might be published. 
 
 Preference was shown to established academic journals. For comments on the 
industry and its state, citations were limited to career professionals with terminal degrees 
and a background in research (and documented evidence of both available for 
verification). For facts on the state of the art, both these and amateur sources were cited, 
provided that the facts had been independently confirmed. For insight into popular 
sentiment and market trends, many lay sources proved useful, but they are, in the review 
to follow, carefully distinguished from statements of fact. 
 
 Government agencies and their publications were considered authoritative sources 
of government policy. Discrepancies often arise between policy and practice, but that is a 
matter for discussion elsewhere. Standards bodies and task forces are considered 
authoritative sources of their standards documentation. 
 
 Articles from disreputable sources were avoided. This includes material deemed 






qualifications, or scrutiny; material closely associated with claims that have already been 
demonstrated false; and material written in such unprofessional language as to call its 
content into question. All sources exhibiting one of these problems were considered 
disreputable until a stronger case could be found for their inclusion, where possible. 
 
 Articles were not considered if they were not published in a source accessible to 
Purdue libraries without additional fees, licensing burdens, or other barriers to study. 
 
2.2 Body of Literature 
 
2.2.1 Fundamental Concepts 
 
 The technology underpinning the RFID devices scrutinized in this study was well 
summarized in earlier publications from Intel Research (Want, 2004): 
 
RFID is an electronic tagging technology (see figure 1) that allows an object, 
place, or person to be automatically identified at a distance without a direct line-








Figure 1 Popular RFID Tags in Various Shapes and Sizes (Want, 2004) 
 
An RFID system is composed of readers and tags. Readers generate signals that 
are dual purpose: they provide power for a tag, and they create an interrogation 
signal. A tag captures the energy it receives from a reader to supply its own power 






An RFID tag is built from three components: 
 Antenna 
 Silicon chip 
 Substrate or encapsulation material 
These tags are generally referred to as passive because they require no batteries or 
maintenance. Tag operation varies according to the frequency at which the tag 
operates. Historically, four common ISM (industrial, scientific, medical) 
frequency bands have been used: 128 kilohertz, 13.56 megahertz, 915 megahertz, 
and 2.45 gigahertz (see figure 2). 
 
 







Passive tags that operate at frequencies up to 100 MHz are usually powered by 
magnetic induction, the same principle that drives the operation of household 
transformers. An alternating current in the reader coil induces a current in the 
tag’s antenna coil, allowing charge to be stored in a capacitor, which then can be 
used to power the tag electronics. Information in the tag is sent back to the reader 
by loading the tag’s coil in a changing pattern over time, which affects the current 
being drawn by the reader coil--a process called load modulation. To recover the 
identity of the tag, the reader simply decodes the change in current as a varying 
potential developed across a series resistance. (p. 43) 
 
Unlike a transformer, the coils of a reader and a tag are separated in space, and 
coupling between the coils can occur only where the magnetic field lines of the 
reader coil intersect with the tag coil, the near field region (see figure 3). Beyond 
this distance the energy breaks away from the antenna as propagating waves that 
we call a radio signal; this is known as the far field region. (p. 43) 
 
 








2.2.2 Clarifying the Problem 
 
 The core RFID technology described above provides the means to tag entities and 
wirelessly obtain tag data. In short, it is a way to tell entities apart from a distance. No 
intrinsic mechanism for security or privacy is included in the specifications (Nogueira & 
Greis, 2009). Until something related arrives through additional regulatory measures, the 
card remains a completely passive device that will release its data whenever interrogated. 
In the state of Washington, for example, no security is built into RFID-enabled driver's 
license cards (ACLU, 2007). Users are encouraged to store the card in an enclosure and 
limit its exposure to unauthorized parties (2007). 
 
 Encryption has been widely touted as a means to prevent disclosure of RFID data 
(Mahmood & Al-Hamdani, 2011), but has not been entirely successful. The popular NXP 
Mifare Classic RFID chip stands as a potent example. Its encryption scheme was 
compromised in 2008, allowing data to be read without authorization, charges to be 
repeated, and cards to be duplicated for false identities (Hammerschmidt, 2008). The chip 
incorporated the high frequency standard mentioned above. It is used widely for personal 
identification, making the vulnerability especially troubling. As other encryption schemes 
are suggested to be stronger replacements for this one, some researchers have turned to 
hardware-based schemes, acting at a lower level to prevent disclosure (Lim & Li, 2008). 
 
 In a prominent RFID lab at the University of Washington, a professor of computer 
science and engineering lead a team of researchers in exploring at depth the social impact 
of this technology. In an interview about the facility (Heim, 2008) he warned that the 
RFID passports and driver's license cards have been designed to expose more information 
than necessary: 
 
There's no reason to have remotely readable technology in a driver's license... 
people don't understand the implications of information they're giving out. They 






you can see this inching forward until we're tracking people wherever they go. 
(p. 3) 
 
 Since the public debut of RFID, Katherine Albrecht has said much about the 
potential pitfalls of careless deployment. Fortunately very little of what this ardent 
privacy activist anticipated ever materialized; but as personal identification advances, it 
may prove helpful to consider her warnings, because resolving consumer anxiety means 
putting them legally and technologically out of reach: 
 
During the past decade a shift toward embedding chips in individual consumer 
goods and, now, official identity documents has created a new set of privacy and 
security problems precisely because RFID is such a powerful tracking technology. 
Very little security is built into the tags themselves, and existing laws offer people 
scant protection from being surreptitiously tracked and profiled while living an 
increasingly tagged life. (2008, para. 4) 
 
 When security investigators at Charles University in Prague examined electronic 
Czech passports, they exclaimed it was "a bit surprising to meet an implementation that 
actually encourages rather than eliminates attacks" (para. 10). 
 
 Recall from the fundamentals section above that two families of standards have 
dominated the market of personal RFID solutions. The contactless national IDs and 
passports of most countries incorporate a tag that meets the industry standard ISO 14443 
(closely related to the ISO 15693 noted earlier), which was developed specifically for 
identification and payment cards (Nogueira & Greis, 2009). Curiously, U.S. border cards 
use the EPCglobal Gen2 standard (closely related to the EPC noted earlier), a shorter-
wavelength standard that was designed to track products in warehouses, where the goal is 
not security but maximum ease of readability (Albrecht, 2008). This is a point that shall 







 A communication from the European Commission to the other European bodies 
listed recommendations for consumer RFID usage. Among these, that personal data 
obtained with this technology is subject to the informed consent of the affected individual 
(Krisch, 2007). It goes on to call for the ability to select when and where RFID data may 
be collected, which "no sufficient mechanisms" currently provide (Krisch, 2007, pp. 5-7). 
This directly beckons researchers to answer with something more effective than the 
Mifare cryptography and more specific than bulk RF shielding. Why not enable selective 
disclosure of individual data fields, as many or as few as might be suitable for any given 
transaction at any given time? 
 
 Without a sufficient mechanism for selecting the circumstances of wireless 
reading and tracking, no guarantee can be made that personal data has not been used 
beyond its intended context. This has occurred in a variety of places already, including 
schools where attendance mechanisms are employed (Brazy, 2010), liquor stores where 
age verification mechanisms are employed (Shaughnessy, 2010), entire states where 
drivers are licensed (McNamara, 2009), and too many other examples to quickly 
summarize. It is clear that concern exists on the part of consumers and citizens. Where 
information is available, it is sought and collected. It is used in any ways that collectors 
believe will become profitable or otherwise advantageous. Selecting against disclosure 
from the onset prevents this entire family of abuses. 
 
2.2.3 A Call for Improvement 
 
 Of the warnings written on the various threats arising when RFID is used for 
personnel, many are inspired not by experience or deep knowledge of the topic, but by 
other, dubious influences that have not shown evidence (Galloway, 2010). For this reason, 
emphasis is given to those that are situated to speak authoritatively: 
 
 The vice president for government affairs at Gemalto, Inc., a major supplier of 






Smart Card Alliance, an RFID industry group, and is serving on the Department of 
Homeland Security's Data Privacy and Integrity Advisory Committee. Still, he has 
sharply criticized the RFIDs in U.S. driver's license and passport cards. In an article for 
Privacy Advisor, a newsletter for privacy professionals, he called the cards vulnerable "to 
attacks from hackers, identity thieves and possibly even terrorists" (Lewan, 2009, para. 
19). 
 
 Similar concerns arose from the AeA--the lobbying association for technology 
firms, the Smart Card Alliance, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the 
Business Travel Coalition, and the Association of Corporate Travel Executives. The 
Department of Homeland Security has been promoting broad use of RFID, even though 
its own advisory committee on data integrity and privacy warned that radio-tagged IDs 
have the potential to allow "widespread surveillance of individuals" without their 
knowledge or consent (Lewan, 2009, para. 22). 
 
 In the wake of the Sept. 11 attacks--and the finding that some of the terrorists 
entered the United States using false passports--the State Department proposed 
mandating that Americans and foreign visitors carry "enhanced" passport booklets, with 
microchips embedded in the covers. The chips, it announced, would store the holder's 
information from the data page, a biometric version of the bearer's photo, and receive 
special coding to prevent data from being altered (Lewan, 2009). 
 
 As gratifying as the measure might have felt at the time, it produced little in terms 
of measurable security for the nation, yet the price to be paid in loss of public confidence 
in the underlying mechanism was profound. In February 2005, when the State 
Department asked for public comment, this was the response: of the 2,335 comments 
received, 98.5% were negative, with 86% expressing security or privacy concerns, the 








 In February 2006, an electronic Dutch passport (which did incorporate encryption) 
was compromised on national television, with researchers gaining access to the 
document's digital photograph, fingerprint and personal data. Then British e-passports 
were hacked using a $500 reader and software written in less than 48 hours (Lewan, 
2009). 
 
 In May 2006, at the University of Tel Aviv, researchers improvised a skimming 
device from a mere $110 worth of parts from hobbyists kits and directly read an 
encrypted tag from several feet away. At the University of Cambridge, a student showed 
that a transmission between an e-passport and a legitimate reader could be intercepted 
from 160 feet (Lewan, 2009). 
 
 When Michigan was pressured by the Department of Homeland Security to add 
RFID to driver's license cards, a state representative called upon their governor to resist, 
saying, "I don't think we need RFID in our licenses period, but even if we did, there is 
absolutely no reason it couldn't be short range and encrypted" (McNamara, 2009, para. 3). 
 
2.2.4 Inviting the Card Overlay Solution 
 
 While much has been written about RFID in industrial engineering collections, 
probably the largest portion deals only with supply chain issues, such as product 
transportation and inventory, or with transaction issues such as cards for near-field 
payment rather than mag-swipe payment. When the readings are limited to those about 
cards for identifying people, they present a surprising few proposed solutions to the 
problem of unauthorized data disclosure. Many industry professionals have limited their 
recommendations on this topic to the usual prudent advice: keep the card in an RF shield 
when it is not in use, and expose it only in range of desired scanning. Since active tags 








 There have been hardware designs intended to make undesired scanning more 
difficult, such as adding switches that only enable reading while the card is being pinched 
in the user's fingers (Huber, 2012), but they still dealt with complete disclosure of the 
data. No design was found in these sources that provides a hardware mechanism for 
disclosing only particular fields of data. That is what prompted its investigation here. 
 
 Many of the functions performed with RFID are also possible with alternative 
technologies, such as digital image processing (Gregorio, 2009). For the sake of focus, 
the principles of effective identification shall be applied here only to RFID technology, 
and in light of the violations to RFID cryptography mentioned earlier, this investigation 
narrowed further to include only hardware-based mechanisms. 
 
 There have been software mechanisms for this purpose (Rieback, Gaydadjiev, 
Crispo, Hofman, & Tanenbaum, 2006), but these obviously operate at a higher level of 
abstraction, and rely upon obstructing the flow of data through code, rather than 
preventing the electrical signals from ever leaving the card. Building security into the 
device closer to the hardware can help to prevent these problems, serving as an effective 
replacement or companion to cryptography. This is a distinction that shall be explored 
further below. 
 
 A trend has been rising in street-corner shops that are under legal requirement to 
verify the age of their patrons. There are documented stores that not only check, but also 
record ID card information when they make alcohol sales. Devices such as the Z22 
CounterTop ID Checker are capable of automatically scanning driver's license cards, 
retaining thousands of their records in onboard memory, or transferring them to external 
computer networks (Shaughnessy, 2010). This encroachment means that the consumer is 
further limited in his ability to control personal data, and prevent future abuses of it. Data 
fields that are not involved in the age verification process are relinquished whenever the 
age field is examined. The data, once collected, leaves the owner's control and may be 






 One of the earliest and most valued contributors to RFID security was Simson 
Garfinkel who, with the aid of two colleagues, published several ideas that seem 
especially noteworthy as having directly influenced the research proposed here. The first 
is what became known as his RFID Bill of Rights, a set of five guiding principles for 
system creation and deployment similar to those established over many decades of 
identification using other technologies. 
 
The Bill states that users of this technology have: 
1. The right to know if a product contains an RFID tag. 
2. The right to have embedded RFID tags removed, deactivated, or destroyed when a 
product is purchased. 
3. The right to first-class RFID alternatives. Consumers should not lose other rights 
(such as the right to return a product or travel on a particular road) if they decide 
to opt-out of RFID or exercise an RFID tag’s kill feature. 
4. The right to know what information is stored inside their RFID tags. If this 
information is incorrect, there must be a means to correct or amend it. 
5. The right to know when, where, and why an RFID tag is being read. 
(Garfinkel, Juels, & Pappu, 2005, p. 41) 
 
 Note that this list deals with policy matters, rather than the mechanisms of 
assurance. It is a reminder that sound regulatory principles are vital to RFID success 
(though beyond the scope of this dissertation). Nonetheless, they cannot be put into effect 
without some underlying mechanism, so it would seem to invite the work proposed. The 
fifth point is probably the one best served by a model of selective disclosure, and it is a 
point highlighted here as vital. 
 
 The team recognized a way that selection could occur: 
 
The farther away a reader is, the greater the noise level in the signal a tag receives. 






rough estimate of the querying reader’s distance and change its behavior 
accordingly. A tag interacting with a distant reader might only reveal the type of 
product it’s attached to--a pair of trousers, for example. When interacting with a 
nearby reader, however, the tag might also reveal its unique identifier. A more 
sophisticated, multi-tiered approach is also possible, in which tags furnish 
increasing amounts of information as readers get closer. (p. 41) 
 
 Though this approach might be of interest to inventors, distance clearly is not 
always the most suitable selection factor in common consumer or citizen cases. 
Regardless, it is important to recognize that containing the intelligence begins with low-
level antenna signal viability, which is precisely what the approach illustrates. If the card 
cannot be sufficiently charged by the wireless reader (a process known as excitation), it 
cannot produce the signal to reply. The card operates in "half duplex", receiving energy 
first and only afterward transmitting any. The reader then accepts the returned signal data, 
and singulates the tag accordingly. 
 
 These researchers also draw attention to the concept of blocker tags, fully 
described by Juels, Rivest, & Szydlo: 
 
The RFID blocker tag takes a different approach to enhancing RFID privacy. It 
involves no modification to consumer tags. Rather, the blocker tag creates an RF 
environment that is hostile to RFID readers. The blocker tag is a specially 
configured, ancillary RFID tag that prevents unauthorized scanning of consumer 
items. In a nutshell, the blocker tag “spams” misbehaving readers so they can’t 
locate the protected tags’ identifiers. At the same time, it permits authorized 
scanners to proceed normally. (Garfinkel et al., 2005, p. 40) 
 
 As a mechanism of rejecting unauthorized readers, this is an intriguing solution. 
What is developed below, though, is a mechanism that provides the means to select and 






RFID devices arises between the user, the card, and the reader. It is possible to create a 
solution in one that causes no new interference to another. 
 




 In existing personal ID applications, if a card is scanned, its entire contents are 
obtained. If only a portion of that information is needed for the action at hand, the 
scanning party is expected to exercise discretion by deleting the remainder. On occasion, 
it is not deleted, but finds its way into other actions, including unauthorized actions. 
There are three major ways this can occur in the existing approach: 
 Sincere Accident (as an embarrassing disclosure of one's age, weight, etc.) 
 Function Creep (as the liquor stores' growing customer databases, etc.) 
 Malicious Misuse (as a malefactor who commits fraud with ID, etc.) 
 
 If the technology within the card does not release private information, then there 
is no need to look after it using technology outside the card. The card (and thus its holder) 
retains custody of the information. There is no need to confirm that such information has 
been securely deleted, seeing that it was never available for abuse. Wherever possible 











 What this work contributes to the RFID industry is a model that does not rely 
upon the competence, morality, or technology of the party performing the scanning, but 
instead builds into the card itself the means of selective disclosure. This principle of 
placing impersonal mechanisms above personal promises removes the opportunity for 
entire families of misuse and crime. It enables the user of the card to be more directly 




 Much of the work done to address privacy compromised through RFID has dealt 
with response measures. Indeed, controlling loss is often best done by early reporting, 
repudiation, and re-issuance, etc. Where users receive guidance on preventative measures, 
it's frequently about looking after the card and the information it contains. A user's ability 
to do this is greatly reduced by several factors in the RFID card design: 
 Information may be read from the card without the holder's knowledge. 
 Reading of the card is possible even if the holder refuses. 
 The holder has no means to choose which data fields are read. 
 
 The design presented here replaces the information pathways that had been 
permanently open with gateways that may be closed, preventing misuse of the 
information, so that the reactions never even need to be addressed. One of the great 
conveniences of RFID is that it can operate through an opaque container such as a wallet, 
without needing to be removed. This can become one of its great problems if there is not 








 Just as it is unrealistic to advise preventing an action that has no feasible barriers, 
it is unrealistic to advise RFID users to take prudent measures if such measures are not 
within the holder's legal or physical reach. By adding a mechanism for access switching 
to the card that the holder may easily set in a readable or unreadable position, the design 
change empowers him to make the decisions and assume personal responsibility for them. 
This brings not only greater assurance to the holder, but also reduced liability to the 
issuer and reader. Much of RFID security has been invisible, even when it is working 
well. Best practices in identification, and many other systems, call for active and visible 
reporting. "It's not enough to make someone secure, that person needs to also realize 
they've been made secure" (Schneier, 2008, para. 12-13). 
 
2.2.4.5 Least Privilege 
 
 A fundamental principle of information assurance is that any given party should 
be granted access to only as much information as necessary to complete the desired 
objective (Amer & Hamilton, 2008). Frequently, though, an article of identification such 
as a driver's license is used to establish a link between only two fields such as a 
photograph and a name or a photograph and an age, etc. even though many other fields 
are included on the card. For printed cards, this matter may be overcome easily enough 
by obscuring those fields (with tape or the like), and making them temporarily unreadable. 
For radio-frequency cards, though, there is no intrinsic means to suppress one field while 
leaving another available. It is for that reason that this design is being introduced, so that 
information fields may be shared wirelessly, on a need-to-know basis, with no additional 






2.2.5 Design Factors 
 
 The RFID card design described in this paper is intended for widespread adoption, 
as a state or national identification document. As such, its logistics deserve some 
explanation. Attractive alternatives to cards are available in the form of various smart 
devices, etc. (Metras, 2005). Why then might the cards be preferable? Here are some of 
the most significant factors that, in the context of this dissertation, border and direct the 




 To fulfill its purpose, the device must be affordable enough to be available to an 
entire population. If the cost of a smart phone on which to run an identification 
application is beyond the means of a user, then routine ID tasks will become unavailable 
with it. Likewise, if the cost to produce and maintain the device are much greater than the 
current cost of government ID documents, the responsible agencies will be under 
burdensome economic pressure. In the United States, even a slight increase in costs will 
be multiplied by a population of over 3 million people (US Census Bureau, 2013). The 
solution must be exceedingly affordable, in terms of not only the materials, but also the 








 ID documents that are issued for use over a period of five or ten years will clearly 
need to be made of materials that can withstand harsh handling. They may be carried 
daily in pockets, wallets, purses, or lanyards. They will be flexed often, and subject to 
temperature extremes. They will get wet. They will be dropped. They will be exposed to 
electromagnetic interference. To remain useful, the device must be resilient. This makes 
even card technologies such as electronic ink or touch-sensitive surfaces seem 
impractical. The electronics of RFID are, themselves, vulnerable to some sources (Juels 
et al., 2003), but they represent a mature technology that is in widespread use today. Card 
durability is well established in consumer environments, even under many harsh 




 The maximum dimensions of a device in regular use would probably be the 
passport, which itself is too big to fit in a common wallet. An ID device much larger than 
a driver's license presents a nuisance to the user that had previously stored a pocket-sized 
card. A design that had switches or connectors extending out from its surface would 
cause it to catch often on its container and on garments, and risk damage to both. It seems 
preferable, then, to use a smooth card with a form factor no larger than about 9cm by 6cm 
on its face, with a thickness no greater than about 1mm that does not require any outer 








 It seems favorable to offer users a solution that exhibits security they can 
understand and privacy they can control (Smith & Spafford, 2004). Neither is possible in 
a system of profound complexity. A solution that operates at a lower level of abstraction 
is preferable to one at a higher level. One that is hardware-based, and thus able to 
function even below the software that might be run above it, is preferable to one that 
depends upon its software platform and its changing maintenance schedule. As discussed 
earlier, simplified RFID mechanisms for feedback and control have been demonstrated. 




 The user is a major cause of ID device failure, often caused by misunderstanding 
complicated technologies (Marqhardt et al., 2010). It is helpful, then, to deploy a product 
that has the look and feel of the cards already in use. The steps taken in using it should 
parallel steps taken with the earlier (print) cards. Where it is possible, it is beneficial to 
make the operation of the device intuitive and transparent. Where it is not, the designer 
might at least make the device behave in ways that suggest what is happening internally, 
so that users will be more likely to act accordingly. When technology serves human 






2.3 Converging on the Topic 
 
 It is clear from the literature that where RFID and information assurance intersect, 
a great variety of research opportunities arise. As discussed above, they narrow down 
from the general and numerous topics to the one specific topic addressed in this 
dissertation: 
 
 At the broadest level is the specter of identity "theft" and misrepresentation. This 
would include all conceivable ID documents and means of misusing them. It would also 
include the various ways to prevent misuse, and among these is the topic of access 
control for documents. As far as the type of document is concerned, all the most popular 
were studied. The passport was considered, of course, and the Social Security card, but 
special emphasis fell upon the state driver's license cards because of how widely they are 
carried and how often they are requested as a form of identification. The history of 
misuses involving a driver's license is still too large to deal with, particularly in light of 
current changes to the cards, so the factor of radio-frequency identification was 
considered particularly. A transition is occurring between printed cards and electronic 
cards, so it would seem a good time to bear down upon RFID for a card akin to the 
driver's license, or certainly something using its same pervasive form factor. It would 
need to be something small enough to fit in a wallet and be carried in the same way as the 
license. It would need to be affordable enough and durable enough that states and nations 
could scale deployment plans to include entire populations. Within all these constraints, 
an opportunity is found to further narrow the work to the prospect of documenting a 
mechanism for card data selection. It reworks established methods of intentionally 
detuning the antennas of an RFID card, using the particular overlay solution described in 






2.4 Prior Works 
 
 To help ensure that the design and function of this solution are in fact unique, an 
exhaustive search was made in the database of the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office. The text and illustrations were read for every patent since 1976 for search criteria 
germane to RFID card technology. All of the results returned were reviewed. Complete 
details may be found in the Appendix section.  
 
 None of the patents read incorporate a multiple-region card of this type, nor the 
selective detuning method described in this dissertation. Those patents that do incorporate 
aspects of the same work are distinguished accordingly. While it remains a matter for 







CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
3.1 Design Objectives 
 
 The introduction and validation of a novel RFID overlay solution was a necessary 
part of this research. Existing RFID cards used to identify personnel suffered from the 
limitations mentioned above, but an alternative card that was shown to overcome these 
limitations has been produced, inviting a discussion of the technologies used in it, and the 
prospect of deploying it for large-scale public use. Its first purpose was to be used here in 
response to the stated Research Questions: 
 
a) Is selective detuning a feasible mechanism for independent selection of RFID 
card data? 
b) Can a design for selective RFID detuning operate reliably enough to be practical? 
 
 Shown in figure 4 is the outward design of a popular RFID personnel card. Other 
than labels for the manufacturer's registered trademarks and an arbitrary decoration, the 
surface is blank. It conveys no visual descriptions of the data it contains or is prepared to 
release. There are no input devices on the card, and no indication of which regions on the 
card are most susceptible to detuning. Of particular note, there is no separation of its data 
fields (or references to fields); the card acts as a single monolithic container. When it is 
read, it releases all the fields (or a unique identifier that may be used to obtain all the 








Figure 4 Commercial RFID Card (HID, 2014) 
 
 The antenna inlay used inside this type of card is shown in figure 5 (2014). Its 
flexible coil follows the perimeter of the card in a nearly symmetric pattern. 
 
 
Figure 5 Antenna Coil Pattern of Common RFID Cards (Cram, 2014) 
 
 In contrast, the demonstrated model uses separate antennas, each of which forms 






printed card, but are insulated from it and are visibly labeled accordingly (see figure 6). 
Access to the data represented by each region may be toggled by obscuring that portion 
of the card with a conductive tape. This analogy makes the device behave in a familiar, 
intuitive way to the user, and does for RF visibility what it does for optical visibility. 
What the experiments were designed to test is whether an overlay of common aluminum 
tape would offer reliable coverage when used with the prototype card, changing it 




Figure 6 Labeled Prototype Card Surface 
 
 In studies concerning disclosure from printed cards, other researchers have done 
work with preformed opaque sleeves (Clement et al., 2012). These serve the same 
purpose as the tape, but allow for faster changing and easier storage. The findings of this 
study on pieces of tape coverage would transfer well to preformed sleeves of aluminum, 
and likely of any similarly conductive material. The aluminum tape was used here for 
three reasons that concern the end user: it is reasonably affordable, it is readily available, 
and it is highly variable. Less precise than machine-cut overlays, tape varies greatly as it 
is cut or torn by the user. Showing that it operates reliably even with a broad tolerance for 
the geometry of the overlay would allow a developer of this card to confidently claim that 







 The aluminum portion of the overlay was electrically continuous, and had no gaps 
within each data field. The total thickness of the metallic layer and its attached adhesive 
layer did not exceed 100μm. 
 
 A successful read outcome was one in which the obscured data fields of the card 
were concealed, but the exposed data fields were revealed. All other possible outcomes 
were considered error conditions, and counted accordingly. The number of errors 
amassed was analyzed statistically. Both the state of the field in question and the read 
outcome were considered categorical variables, and both were assigned binary values. 
Any read condition that failed to read the entire contents of a data field during 
interrogation was considered a negative outcome. All others were considered positive. 
 
3.2 Experiment Design 
 
 From each of the two Research Questions first posed in the Introduction follows a 
testing track suitable for its inquiry. The hypotheses, variables, and experiments are 
separate for each of these tracks, and the statistical tools applied accordingly. Data were 
collected for each, and their patterns lead to two sets of results. From these, the unified 
Conclusions section was composed. 
 
3.2.1 Test 1: Independence 
 
[from Research Question A]: 
Is selective detuning a feasible mechanism for independent selection of RFID card data? 
 
 It is necessary to test whether there exists a relationship between the overlay 
coverage on a given data region of the card and the readability of other data regions. 
What is needed from a usable design is that no region of the card be detuned by overlay 










Access to the data of a given field will not depend upon the overlay coverage of a field 
other than its own. 
 
 The hypothesis stands unless access exhibits dependence on coverage of a region 
of the card other than the region labeled for its own field. That is, the test fails to reject 
H0a if the state of coverage for one region of the card does not reliably correlate with 
readability of data from the other region.  
 
3.2.1.1.2 H1 
Access to the data of a given field will depend upon the overlay coverage of a field other 
than its own. 
 
 The hypothesis stands if access exhibits dependence on coverage of a region of 
the card other than the region labeled for its own field. That is, the test rejects H0a if the 
state of coverage for one region of the card reliably correlates with readability of data 
from the other region. 
 




Involved in the direct effect testing: 
X Independent - coverage state of region (binary categorical) 







Recorded for procedural purposes in the laboratory: 
region under test (binary categorical) 
current pass (scalar) and pass count (scalar) 





3.2.1.3 Data Collection 
 
 Before testing the effect of the card's overlay mechanism, it was necessary to test 
the laboratory equipment and the core RFID technology. A baseline test was conducted, 
in each of the 3 axial orientations, with the card's data regions completely exposed. All 
the equipment passed. With the baseline complete, samples were taken with the data 
regions completely obscured. Results were compared to the baseline. Then, to make 
certain that the suppression of the obscured fields had been temporary, and had not 
resulted in any lasting effect to the card, additional samples were taken completely 
exposed. The equipment performed without malfunction, according to its normal 
advertised operation. 
 
 One of the two data fields was randomly selected for treatment in the first testing 
course. It was completely obscured, while the remaining field was completely exposed. 
Samples were taken in each of the 3 axial orientations. The second testing course 
proceeded in similar fashion with the coverage states exchanged, for an equal number of 
samples. Data were aggregated and compared against cycle count to obtain the total fault 
count. It is considered a "transfer fault" if the reader fails to obtain data from an exposed 








 The purpose of dividing the total run into 3 subsets is to represent the 3 axis of 
rotation. This serves to control for variation that might arise from the orientation of the 
card as it is presented to the reader. Cards were swept through the entire range of motion 
during each read attempt, and the results were separated according to axis so that any 
effect arising from orientation might be correlated with it during the statistical analysis. 
 
 As the arrangement also controlled for the rotation of the card as it approached the 
reader, it was important that the sampling be allowed to run for several thousand cycles in 
each record set, giving good opportunity for any card anomalies to be observed and 
separated from the effects of the overlay. Card antennas are not isotropic radiators, but 
rather do exhibit nulls, similar to the nulls at the ends of a dipole radiator, that may be 
clearly observed at a distance. They become increasingly less observable as the distance 
is reduced. Allowing the cards to rotate through their entire range of motion helped to 
ensure that any nearby materials that might have acted as parasitic radiators affected the 
entire set of subjects, with minimal bias (see figure 7). The card's own driven element 














3.2.1.4 Statistical Analysis 
 
 The statistical significance of a variable's deviation may be found by comparing it 
to a χ² distribution (Cook, et al., 2001). This is among the most straightforward ways to 
test the independence of two categorical variables, which is precisely what was needed in 
this experiment. The relationship between the concealed region and the overlay coverage 
of the concealed region was tested, as was the relationship between of the exposed region 
and the coverage of the concealed region. This was done for each region's data against the 
opposing region's coverage to test whether it was possible for any of the coverings to 
affect data outside the boundaries of their respective regions. A test was then conducted 
for the relationship between the concealed region and its own coverage, to confirm that 
the covering directly affected data within its boundaries. 
 
3.2.2 Test 2: Reliability 
 
[from Research Question B]: 
Can a design for selective RFID detuning operate reliably enough to be practical? 
 
 For the card design to be practical in the hands of its users, it must function with 
an inconsistent overlay. If the aluminum tape is used, there may be variation between one 
application of the tape and another. The card must present a range of coverage within 
which a given field will assuredly be concealed and beyond which it will assuredly be 
readable. Just as the user name on a printed card field does not become completely 
readable if a mere 10% of the text is made visible, so this RFID card must not become 
completely readable if a mere 10% is made scannable, etc. 
 
 To test the variety of ways the aluminum overlay might be cut for use on the card, 
the pattern itself was randomized. The chosen region began with an overlay that 
completely obscured it. Each reduction was made with a single linear cut, separating 50% 






polygon center--the point equidistant from each vertex--and followed a randomly selected 
line through half a unit circle, or π radians, describing the overlay (see figure 8). A new 
angle was chosen for each cut, and half the material was removed for each set, until its 
effect was deemed negligible. This occurred when read operation succeeded in spite of 
the overlay more often than 1% of the time in the testing course. 
 
Figure 8 Reduction Guide for the Overlay 
 
 To illustrate that the tapering of the observed effect is, in fact, caused by the 
tapering of the true effect, one additional testing course was taken, at one additional 
overlay reduction, beyond the course in which the 1% threshold was met. Only when the 










The effect of the overlay will not show a predictable decline as its coverage is reduced. 
 
 The hypothesis stands if the transition effect from covered to uncovered state is 
not sufficiently pronounced. That is, the test fails if the graph of the effect trails off 
gradually through the transition rather than falling abruptly. The coverage area of the card 
regions were decreased logarithmically as the test continued, and the reliability of the 
read attempt recorded. If the effect is pronounced and reliable close to the transition point, 
then it should exhibit a significant difference across samples with different coverage 
areas, but not a significant difference among samples of the same coverage area. 
 
3.2.2.1.2 H2 
The effect of the overlay will show a predictable decline as its coverage is reduced. 
 
 The selective tuning design is considered reliable if its outcomes with respect to 
coverage percentage are so predictable as to beat chance at the stated confidence level. 
 








Involved in the direct effect testing: 
X Independent - coverage percentage of region (categorical) 
Y Dependent - readability of region (binary categorical) 
 
Recorded for procedural purposes in the laboratory: 
region under test (binary categorical) 
current pass (scalar) 
pass count (scalar) 
current orientation (trinary categorical) 
number of unsuccessful interrogations on an exposed region. 













3.2.2.3 Statistical Analysis 
 
 A binary logistic regression was plotted to test the relationship between the 
coverage of the target data region and the readability of the region. For the hypothesis of 
reliability to be accepted, there needs to be evidence that the difference between a 
readable and an unreadable region strongly correlated with its overlay coverage. Further, 
the transition region that occurs as the surface area of the overlay is reduced should be 
narrow, signifying that overlay dimensions exhibit little uncertainty. The binary 
distinction between an exposed region and a concealed region should be sharp. 
 
3.2.3 Experimental Protocol 
 




 Each subject unit of this experiment was a pass of the card through the RF field of 
the reader at a specified coverage and range of orientation. The process was automated by 
means of a mechanical conveyor, and require no human subject participation. While it 
could be argued that human bodies might impair readability of the card by adding field 
blockage or detuning, there is no apparent means by which they might improve 
readability of a card that has been obscured as unreadable. For this reason, card 
processing is automated. This served the interest of time, so that many cycles of the test 




 The experimental card design is a customized passive RFID tag system that used 






fields to be obscured without affecting the others, the card surface was divided into two 
labeling regions. Silkscreen marking on the surface corresponded to antenna boundaries 
in the substrate below (figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10 Obscured Fields, and the Data Released 
 The reader was an ordinary ISO-14443 commercial board connected to the 
computer system via USB port, and to a commercial antenna inside a common 
polypropylene radome operating in unobstructed space, with a radiation lobe focused on 








Figure 11 Card, Conveyor, and RFID Reader 
 
 Any variation attributable to the direction of approach was controlled by 
approaching the read antenna from both directions, as shown. The apparatus was 
mounted far enough to carry the card beyond the confirmed read range, and close enough 
to pass through the antenna's near field. The configuration was similar to the robotic 
positioning system used in the Georgia Tech RFID testbed. It was needed because card 







3.2.4 Laboratory Conditions 
 
 The card used in the experiment was designed for symmetric wireless regions, 
and constructed to minimize internal interference. The active regions were selected by 
detuning a portion of the onboard antenna with aluminum tape. A brief trial run was 
conducted for both the exposed, obscured, and partially obscured states to ensure that no 
apparent defect or bias in operation was visible. Card coverage was selected randomly 
without replacement to represent either 01 or 10, where 0 indicated that the region should 
be exposed and 1 indicated it should receive an overlay. 
 
 It is considered a Type I error for the reader to record an unsuccessful 
interrogation on an uncovered region. Note that this may be confounded by factors such 
as 
 Background radiation 
 Electrical utility glitches 
 Damage to the card 
 Physical obstruction 
 Insufficient dwell time 
 Wireless signal collisions 
 
 To control for these factors, the test were conducted in a prepared laboratory 
environment. A Geiger counter sweep confirmed that no significant ionizing source of 
radiation was present during the testing, and any interference from nuclear emissions was 
naturally occurring, at under .04mR per hour. A broadband field strength meter was used 
to confirm that non-ionizing background radiation was likewise no higher than the 
ambient noise floor, and at least 30dB below the manufacturers' advertised threshold of 
interference for the reader device. The temperature of no surface or air space was outside 
of a range from 20°C to 30°C. Humidity was controlled to between 40% and 50%, and 
barometric pressure was between 990hPa and 1025hPa. Personnel were in contact with 






instruments were powered by a conditioned, uninterruptible electrical circuit at 
125VAC+/-2%.  
 
The cards used in the test were recently manufactured, inspected thoroughly on site, and 
handled with sufficient care as to prevent wear. The test apparatus provided an 
unobstructed line of sight between the interrogator antenna and the RFID card, passed it 
through the range of operation slowly enough to provide dwell necessary for a read 
operation, and avoided collisions with the radio fields of nearby cards by physically 
isolating the card under test. 
 
 It is considered a Type II error if the reader records a successful interrogation on a 
covered region. This may be confounded by factors such as 
 An inconsistent bond between the cover and card 
 Damage to the cover material 
 Misidentification of the card under test 
 Active interference 
 
 To control for these factors, the cover was fabricated from a tape of consistent 
manufacturing specifications, for which the aluminum and adhesive layers together did 
not exceed 100μm in thickness. This was applied directly to the card, with no additional 
buffer in between, and no cracks or wrinkles in the cover. In successive trials, the fields 
were swapped, which would have exposed the effect of any lasting damage to one field. 
 
 The cards used in this experiment were programmed with unique identification 
tokens, and as mentioned above, the test was conducted in an isolated environment, 
beyond the range of any card that might be misidentified as the test subject or other 








 The question of usable range often arises in RFID discussions. There is no 
decisive answer on how far away a card may be used with a reader until it is specified 
what type of reader, antenna, power level, etc. are used in what environment, with what 
radio landscape, etc. Cards of this type are often categorized as "proximity" tags, 
intended for use within about 1m of a reader under normal operating conditions 
(Nogueira & Greis, 2009). This would easily satisfy conditions where a user might hold 
out a card before a reader on a door, etc. The experiments outlined in this paper took this 
into account with a testing apparatus placing the tags no farther than half the maximum 
distance published by the manufacturer. 
 
 As it is vital that obscured fields on the card are rendered unreadable for as long 
as the overlay is in place, the card's distance from the radome was not measured as a 
variable. Rather, the entire usable range was involved. Each pass began at a point 
considered unusable for reading, swept through the closest usable proximity to the 
radome, and continued until again beyond range. Successful interrogation at any distance 
in this range was considered a successful outcome. 
 
 The card was exposed to the maximum effective radiated power available within 
the constraints of the reader system and FCC regulations, to rule out the possibility that 
the overlays are only effective at lower power, as license and passport covers are (Lewan, 
2009). While this does not disprove that devices operating at unlawfully high power 
might yet be able to penetrate the overlay, it is sufficient for the purposes of a prototype. 
As mentioned earlier, the mass production design would use a switching method that is 
not diminished even if the radiated power is increased. 
 
 The orientation of the card remains a source of uncertainty in read success rates, 
so sampling was done on all three axis of rotation, using a dielectric swivel on which the 
card might rotate freely through its entire range of possible orientations. By connecting 
this to a servomotor rotating at a rate slow enough to prevent read interference yet fast 






card, at every angle with respect to the radome. While it would be possible, in practical 
settings, for the card to find itself in oblique orientations that would require spherical 
coordinates to describe, the radiation pattern advertised for the type of antennas used in 
the experiment covers these orientations as readily as those on orthogonal axis (Philips, 
2002). For this reason, 3D rotation is considered rigorous for removing this variable 
during testing. 
 
 It was vital that the experiment demonstrate not only that the obscured data field 
became unreadable, but also that the exposed fields did not. It has already been 
established that storing the card in a suitably shielded enclosure, under normal operating 
conditions, will reduce the readability of every field (Koscher et al., 2009). What was 
needed here was the means to select desired fields to be read while leaving all other fields 
unaffected. For this reason, the field to be obscured in each testing was randomized, and 
the read outcomes were recorded for all fields during every pass through the reader. 
 
 As each testing set was satisfied, half of the remaining aluminum overlay was 
removed from the affected fields, and testing resumed. Because the overlay is only a 
reliable switch if its effect on the card drops off steeply as its area is reduced, 
comparisons were made between each set of coverage. Reliability could then be 
confirmed if the difference between satisfying the stated confidence level and failing to 
satisfy occurred at a boundary between sets--that is, precisely after a portion of the 
overlay had been removed. 
 
3.2.5 Testing Schedule 
 
These are the steps taken for the experiments: 
 
1. Construct the 2-region prototype RFID card 
2. Mark fields and serial numbers of each region 






4. Verify failure to read fully obscured card (both regions taped at 100% coverage) 
5. Uncover both regions 
6. Verify that coverage effects are temporary and reversible 
7. Begin experimental taping: randomly select one of the 2 regions 
8. Apply tape to respective region 
9. Reset cycle count to 0 
10. Record serial numbers of covered and uncovered regions 
11. Mount card on conveyor, with motor set for rotation on pitch axis 
12. Run for 1000 cycles, recording read results 
13. Mount card on conveyor, with motor set for rotation on roll axis 
14. Run for 1000 cycles, recording read results 
15. Mount card on conveyor, with motor set for rotation on yaw axis 
16. Run for 1000 cycles, recording read results 
17. Conduct test of independence of the readings on the first region 
18. Record p-value; flag if greater than confidence level 
19. Shift overlays one position 
20. Repeat cycling procedure 
21. Continue experimental taping: randomly select one of the 2 regions 
22. Randomly select an angle from half of unit circle; halve the overlay along angle 
23. Repeat data recording for each of 3 axis, as described 
24. Compare data with confidence threshold; continue collection until met 
25. One threshold is met, record outcome 
26. Run for additional confirmatory course of 1000 cycles 
27. Perform final statistical analyses 






3.3 Statistical Analyses 
 
 The test process was modeled using 2x2 contingency tables of outcomes, with the 
state of coverage on one dimension, and the interrogation result on the other. Such a table 
accurately represents each of the 4 field state combinations. In successive tables, the total 
surface area of the overlay is halved. To test the extent to which the availability of card 
data is affected by the detuning of the overlays, one inviting instrument would be a 
regression analysis. 
 
 Linear regressions are frequently applied in similar studies, where continuous data 
values are possible, but the binary outcomes of the card interrogation in this case made a 
logistic regression analysis most appropriate. A thorough explanation of the differences 
between the two, and the unique suitability of the latter in binary cases such as this one 
appears in Iowa State University's project Beyond Traditional Statistical Methods (Cook, 
Dixon, Duckworth, Kaiser, Koehler, Meeker, and Stephenson, 2001). 
 
 Given the independence of the card observations, logistic regression would indeed 
seem a fitting tool. The experiment proposed involves thousands of samples, and involves 
nothing that would apparently skew the error distribution. 
 
Just as with ordinary least squares regression we need some means of determining 
the significance of the estimates of the model parameters. We also need a means 
of assessing the fit, or lack of fit, of the logistic model. Inference for logistic 
regression is often based on the deviance (also known as the residual deviance). 
The deviance is twice the log-likelihood ratio statistic. The deviance for a logistic 
model can be likened to the residual sum of squares in ordinary least squares 
regression for the linear model. The smaller the deviance the better the fit of the 
logistic model. A large value for the deviance is an indication that there is a 
significant lack of fit for the logistic model and some other model may be more 






Asymptotically, the deviance has a χ² distribution. Therefore, to perform tests of 
hypotheses regarding the fit of the model the deviance is compared to the 
percentiles of a χ² distribution. The degrees of freedom is determined by the 
number of observations less the number of parameters estimated. Keep in mind 
that this is an asymptotic (large sample size) procedure and the P-values 
calculated using the χ² distribution are approximate. (Cook, et al., 2001) 
 
The difference between the null deviance and the residual deviance represents the 
effect of adding the single explanatory variable to the logistic model. This is 
analogous to the change is the sum of squared residuals (sum of squares for error) 
in ordinary least squares regression. When an explanatory variable is added in 
ordinary least squares regression, the change in the sum of squares for error 
represents the amount of variability explained by that variable. The change in 
deviance in logistic regression can be compared to a χ² distribution to determine 
statistical significance. The degrees of freedom for the χ² is equal to the number of 
predictor variables added to the model, in this case, 1. Keep in mind that this test, 
like all the others, requires a large sample size and any results are approximate. 
(Cook, et al., 2001) 
 
An alternative to the change in deviance for determining statistical significance of 
predictor variables in logistic regression is given by an approximate z-test statistic: 
 
z= estimated parameter / standard error 
Figure 12 Approximate Z-Test Statistic 
 
This z-test statistic has an approximate standard normal distribution for large 
samples. For very large samples (another asymptotic result) the change in 
deviance and the square of the z-test statistic should give approximately the same 







 To prevent the inaccuracies that may arise from hand transcription and 
mathematical operations, the analyses of this experiment were run in the laboratory using 
the statistical language R. Data sets were collected directly into computer files and 
hashed with an error-detection code. Resulting figures and tables were machine generated 
using standard function libraries. No transcription errors were detected in the data. 
 
 Reputable RFID tag testing is ordinarily conducted at a 95% or 99% confidence 
level (Maniyan, Ghassemi, & Rahrovy, 2012). Given the high manufacturing tolerance of 
most tags, confidence at both levels can be regularly met by technologies used as 
designed, within reasonable environmental limits (Shahzad & Liu, 2012). Testing was 
conducted at the higher confidence interval, as it has been shown that in similar lab test 
protocols, the number of tag responses differs little from the number of read attempts for 






CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
4.1 Test 1: Independence 
 
4.1.1 Preliminary Testing Overview 
 
 A baseline test was conducted with the card's data regions completely exposed. 
1000 samples were taken in each of the 3 axial orientations, for a total of 3000 samples. 
With the baseline established, and proper operation of the reader equipment demonstrated, 
the next 3000 were taken, with the data regions completely obscured. Results were 
compared to the baseline. Then, to make certain that the suppression of the obscured 
fields had been temporary, and had not resulted in any lasting effect to the card, an 
additional 3000 samples were taken completely exposed. No functional anomalies were 
observed. 
 
4.1.2 Direct Effect Test Overview 
 
 One of the two data fields was randomly selected for treatment in the direct effect 
test, which began with the fourth course, as shown in table 2. The selected field was 
completely obscured, while the remaining field was completely exposed. 1000 samples 
were taken in each of the 3 axial orientations, for a total of 3000 samples. The fifth 
course then proceeded in similar fashion with the coverage states exchanged, for an 
additional 3000 samples. Data were aggregated and compared against cycle count to 







 It is considered a "transfer fault" if the reader fails to obtain data from an exposed 
region of the card, and a "blocking fault" if the reader obtains data from an obscured 




4.1.3.1 Preliminary Testing 
 
Table 1 Preliminary Test I Data 
Course Scan Total Coverage¹ Transfer Faults² Blocking Faults² 
1 3000 0,0 1 = (0+0+1) -NA- 
2 3000 1,1 -NA- 0 = (0+0+0) 
3 3000 0,0 0 = (0+0+0) -NA- 
Note: 
¹ 0: exposed, 1: concealed 
² total is sum of faults on axes (roll+pitch+yaw) 
 
4.1.3.2 Direct Effect Test 
 
Table 2 Direct Effect Test I Data 
Course Scan Total Coverage¹ Transfer Faults² Blocking Faults² 
4 3000 0,1 0 = (0+0+0) 0 = (0+0+0) 
5 3000 1,0 2 = (1+1+0) 0 = (0+0+0) 
Note: 
¹ 0: exposed, 1: concealed 








 The data are visibly compelling even before statistical tools are used. At full data 
field coverage, not a single instance of blocking failure has been observed. The incidents 
of data transfer failure have demonstrated no statistically significant pattern, and remain 
within the advertised tolerance of an RFID card under normal operating conditions. 
Using statistical tools, the independence of the regions under test may be quantified. 
 
 As explained above, the statistical significance of a variable's deviation may be 
found by comparing it to a χ² distribution (Cook, et al., 2001). A test for independence 
was conducted on the relationship between the blocking faults of both the concealed 
region and the exposed region with respect to the state of coverage on the concealed 
region. This involves placing the sums of the faults and states on opposing axes of a 
matrix and feeding them into the χ² test. The regions' coverage is considered independent 
unless the test returns a p-value below α. The following resulted from R: 
 
Table 3 Test for Independence of Data Fields 
Data Region χ² value degrees of freedom p-value 
1 0.0007 1 0.9794 
2 0.0007 1 0.9794 
 
 The input values for the second region were, of course, equal to the first but 
compared against the first region rather than the second. The output values were equal. 
 
 H0a (One data field will not depend upon the overlay coverage of another field.) 
has withstood the test, as its p-value is considerably higher than the boundary of .01. The 
null hypothesis is accepted. 
 








 This hypothesis was put forth to test the first Research Question. Confirming it 
demonstrated that selective detuning is a feasible mechanism for independent selection of 
card data. 
 
4.1.6 Further Investigation 
 
 For additional rigor, the test was given a second run, but this time to measure how 
the target region's state of coverage affected its own readability. The result indicated a 
strong dependency (with a p-value well below the .01 boundary). In other words, the 
overlay affects readability of its own data, but only its own data: 
 
Table 4 Alternative Test for Independence 
Data Region χ² value degrees of freedom p-value 
1 5988.009 1 <.001e-3 








4.2 Test 2: Reliability 
 
4.2.1 Preliminary Testing Overview 
 
 A baseline test was conducted with the card's data regions completely exposed. 
1000 samples were taken in each of the 3 axial orientations, for a total of 3000 samples. 
With the baseline established, and proper operation of the reader equipment demonstrated, 
the next 3000 were taken, with the data regions completely obscured. Results were 
compared to the baseline. Then, to make certain that the suppression of the obscured 
fields had been temporary, and had not resulted in any lasting effect to the card, an 
additional 3000 samples were taken completely exposed. No functional anomalies were 
observed. See Data section of Test 1 for preliminary test data. 
 
4.2.2 Direct Effect Test Overview 
 
 For the first testing course, a randomly selected data field was obscured except for 
50% of the surface area of the overlay, which was removed along a randomly selected 
angle through its midpoint (as described in Methods). 1000 samples were taken in each of 
the 3 axial orientations, for a total of 3000 samples. It is considered a "blocking fault" if 
the reader obtains data from an obscured region. The number of such faults was 
compared against the threshold value of 30 (obtained by taking the number that is 1% of 
the total number of samples in the testing course). This number did not meet the threshold, 
so the test continued. 
 
 For the second testing course, the data field's overlay surface area was further 
reduced to 25% in another randomly selected portion. 1000 samples were taken in each 
of the 3 axial orientations, for a total of 3000 samples. The number of blocking faults was 
compared against the threshold value. This number met the threshold. The testing 
schedule called for a third course. If the trend continued through this confirmatory course, 






 For the third testing course, the data field's overlay surface area was further 
reduced to 12.5% along another randomly selected angle. 1000 samples were taken in 
each of the 3 axial orientations, for a total of 3000 samples. The number of blocking 
faults was compared against the threshold value. This number, too, met the threshold, so 




Table 5 Direct Effect Test II Data 
Course Scan Total Coverage¹ Transfer Faults² Blocking Faults² 
1 3000 .5 0 = (0+0+0) 0 = (0+0+0) 
2 3000 .25 0 = (0+0+0) 1 = (1+0+0) 
3 3000 .125 0 = (0+0+0) 3000 = (1000+1000+1000) 
Note: 
¹ percentage of surface area 




 A binomial logistic regression is needed to visualize the transition of a data field 
from its exposed state to its concealed state. The result of its test signifies whether the 
effect should be seen as reliable, and the slope of the regression curve provides an 







Table 6 Binary Logistic Regression Test for Reliability 
Deviance Residuals 
Min. 1Q Median 3Q Max. 
-6.7280 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.0365 
Intercept Coefficients 
Estimate Std. Error z value   
22.633 1.732 13.07   
Coverage 
Estimate Std. Error z value  Pr(>|z|) 
-61.279 4.899 -12.51  <.001e-3 
 
 When the read outcomes of testing at all coverage levels are aggregated and 
plotted, a sharp transition becomes visible between 25% and 50% coverage. The logistic 









Figure 13 Logistic Regression Curve of Overlay Effect 
 
 This indicates that the card has succeeded in separating clearly the distinction 
between a concealed region and an exposed region. Its behavior is as close to binary as 
practical, and tends toward the shape of a square wave. 
 
 H0b (The effect of the overlay will not show a predictable decline as its coverage 
is reduced.) has been rejected as its probability is considerably lower than the boundary 
of .01. 
 
 H2 (The effect of the overlay will show a predictable decline as its coverage is 







 The success rate fell from 100% to 99.9% as coverage was reduced from 50% to 
25%, yet from 99.9% to 0% when coverage was reduced from 25% to 12.5%. The 





 This hypothesis was put forth to test the second Research Question. Confirming it 
demonstrated that selective detuning operates reliably enough to be practical even in a 
user landscape where the coverage area is likely to be inconsistently applied, due to 
human variation and error. 
 
4.2.6 Further Investigation 
 
 Given how the antenna pattern geometry varies in different directions, it seems 
reasonable to suspect that orientation of the overlay on the card data region would 
become highly influential near the surface area transition. For this reason, several other 
orientations of 25% surface area were tried, and eventually one was found that resulted in 







Table 7 Alternative Orientation Test 
 
Course Scan Total Coverage¹ Transfer Faults² Blocking Faults² 
4 3000 .25 0 = (0+0+0) 1 = (1,0,0) 
Note: 
¹ percentage of surface area 
² total is sum of faults on axes (roll+pitch+yaw) 
 
 The same attempts were made at 12.5% coverage, but no such orientation was 
found. The user may be confident that coverage greater than half of the region will 







CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Research Question I 
 
 The following line of investigation began with the first Research Question: 
"Is selective detuning a feasible mechanism for independent selection of RFID card 
data?" 
 
 From this came hypothesis H0a: 
"Access to the data of a given field will not depend upon the overlay coverage of a field 
other than its own." 
 
 This hypothesis has been tested experimentally and accepted. 
 
 Building a card with multiple sensing regions is simple and affordable, as it is 
with existing RFID card models. Selecting regions with a readily available material such 
as aluminum tape works decisively to select card data, provided that over 50% of the 
region is covered. It is effective even when the user is imprecise and the environmental 
effects arduous enough to damage the overlay. Data fields are not significantly affected 
by changes to the coverage status of their neighbors. The feasibility of the overlay 
method has been demonstrated. 
 
5.2 Research Question II 
 
 The following line of investigation began with the second Research Question: 






 From this came the second Hypothesis: 
"The effect of the overlay will decline reliably as its coverage is reduced in the tested 
region." 
 
 This hypothesis has been tested experimentally and accepted. 
 
 The design tested here exhibited few operating failures. Data intended for 
disclosure was successfully read as often, on average, as with existing RFID cards. Data 
intended for concealment was successfully kept from being read in every instance where 
overlay coverage of the data region was between 50% and 100%. Excess overlay material 
was not a source of interference, provided that it caused no more than 25% coverage. 
Subject to statistical tests , this proved to be a reliable design, both in terms of the 




 RFID card technology is frequently billed as an upgrade to printed cards, and a 
likely if not inevitable successor. It seems reasonable that if a device is called an 
"upgrade", it offers at least the functionality of its predecessor. By making the granular 
selection of data fields impossible, popular RFID cards have shown at least one way in 
which they represent a decline in value to the user. It is a difference that has been felt, 
and is quantifiably significant to them, such that they are willing to shape their behavior 
accordingly (Clement et al., 2012).The model illustrated here restores selection function, 
and allows it to happen by a familiar method that closely parallels what had been done to 
conceal fields on printed media. 
 
 Owing to its simple, affordable design, the model card is a practical solution to 
the needs of a large user population. It does not suffer from the granularity limitations of 






cost barriers of processor-based cards. It is ready for mass production and distribution. It 
is easily replaced if lost or damaged. Its size is comparable to the form factor of existing 
cards, and it may be used in the manner of existing cards. It simply adds to them the new 
functionality of non-contact RFID technology. The switching mechanism is of an 
importance that grows in proportion to public concern over the unauthorized acquisition 
and use of personal information from identification cards. RFID allows data to be 
acquired from a distance, and without any user notification, so a means to toggle card 
access is immediately attractive. Refining that access down to the level of specific data 
fields adds a flexibility to the experience that was not available in the comprehensive card 
shielding solution used in established cards. 
 
 It was expected that a novel design with independent switching regions of this 
type could be constructed. Early modeling suggested that the electromagnetic 
compatibility requirements could be met using the antenna geometries described here for 
the card. Experimentally, it was found that independence had indeed been demonstrated 
with each data field against the other, consistently enough to meet the threshold of 
statistical hypothesis testing. While internal coupling of charge would have been a 
problem for various other designs outside this study's scope, it has been successfully 
prevented here by the unique approach used. The extent to which the data fields have 
been made independent is sufficient to support the claim that what is done to reveal or 
conceal one field shall not have an effect on any other fields. 
 
 As the reliability of RFID read operations on established card designs is very high, 
it was expected that the reliability of the prototype cards during normal reading would 
fare no worse in test. This was indeed confirmed. It was the prospect of achieving 
similarly high likelihood of blocking operations that made the experiment following 
Research Question II so inviting. As discussed earlier, blocking methods involving 
detuning can exhibit very high reliability. Since the prototype was constructed to exacting 
specifications and given preliminary testing that presented no surprises, it was expected 






remarkable anomaly would become apparent. No anomaly was recorded. Blocking 
performance not only met but exceeded that of read performance, suggesting that in 
applications involving longer periods of recording and larger numbers of users the 
overlays would be as reliable as comprehensive card shielding. 
 
 The review of literature pertinent to RFID began in the mid-1990s. All material 
was taken into account, and all published in 2000 or later was considered for citation here. 
Articles from a variety of the most popular academic and public news sources were read 
in search of ideas for how the data field granularity issue was being addressed. The 
catalogs of major RFID manufacturers were regularly reviewed also, as their products 
were being used in earlier research projects. For this particular project, the question of 
whether detuning overlays had been presented as a solution for independent field 
selection was specifically posed using Purdue's library search facilities--some of the most 
powerful in the nation. The US Patent and Trade Office was likewise searched 
comprehensively for claims to any invention that might sound similar enough in 
description to indicate that it was no longer a novel approach (see Appendix for details). 
As nothing of this nature was found, it is introduced here. Other researchers clearly knew 
that detuning without complete shielding was possible, but did not present it as a means 
of data field selection. As far as determined, the description presented above is original. 
 
5.3.1 A Review of the Testing Protocol 
 
 As the experimental portion of this work was being prepared, an early and 
obvious question concerned what are the factors most influential in the success and 
failure of ordinary RFID read operations. In the Experiment Design appears the complete 
list of factors that were controlled, but in practical use there are two that tend to dominate 
all others. The first is distance between the card and reader. As explained, a proximity 
card is only usable on the order of a few meters during normal operation. It was clear that 
during the experiment the card would need to be close enough to the reader to accurately 






transmitting at a continuous duty cycle, and from a distance. It would need to move 
smoothly through the full range of space at a speed slow enough to allow any area of 
weakness in the card or the radiation pattern to become observable. 
 
 The second dominant factor is card orientation. As detailed under the Data 
Collection section of Chapter 3, the radiation pattern of the antennas used in RFID cards 
(both the prototype design and its commercial predecessors) is not equal in all spherical 
directions. In fact, the differences can be profound enough that, for example, a user might 
find a card held in orientation perpendicular to the panel antenna commonly used with 
readers is not readable, even on the order of a few centimeters away, until the card is 
rotated in hand. This brings the elements of both antennas closer to parallel, and closer to 
coupling for maximum energy transfer. In order to test card performance in terms of 
independence or reliability, it would first be necessary to control for how the card's 
orientation varies during common use. This is why the test apparatus comprises a 
separate motorized mount that sweeps each pass of the card through its entire range of 
axial orientations. It was chosen as a practical way of proving that no superior card 
position had been overlooked during the course of testing. 
 
 The mechanical gantry illustrated in figure 11 had to reliably support the mounted 
shuttle and rotator over many cycles as they that conveyed the card into and out from the 
read zone. They had a simple path to travel, but plenty of ways to glitch if assembled 
without regard for detail. The power supply driving them was connected to a conditioned 
municipal source, and rectified to direct current. Batteries were avoided, as their voltage 
would vary over time as they discharged. The gears and bearings were housed in fully 
enclosed boxes to keep them resistant to dust and debris. The timing of the system was 
microcontrolled, not because the degree of precision this offers was required for the card 
passes, but because the ease by which feedback may be used here for keeping the parts 







 As construction of the experimental system was happening, a great deal of testing 
was done on the possible detuning effects of the motors, hardware, and other parts of the 
system. The focus of testing was the overlay, and care was taken to ensure that no other 
parts involved confounded the results. A transistorized dip meter was employed to 
measure the absorption by the card's antennas of RF energy on the fixed frequency of 
operation, 13.56MHz. It was quickly determined how far from the antennas other 
conductive materials would have to be in order to prevent interference with the overlay. 
System hardware interference was reduced below detectable levels by increasing the 
parts' distance from the antenna portions. A spacing was chosen to promote compatibility 
between the moving parts and the electromagnetic fields near them. 
 
 The practical efficacy of this card has been demonstrated in a controlled setting. It 
beckons further studies that might include test replications. If experiments related to this 
work are undertaken in the future, they might be conducted differently, with some of 
these points considered: 
 
 To the extent they are available, university research facilities may be an expedient 
and helpful source of existing test equipment. There is much common preparation in all 
such experiments, and energy could have been saved if the space had been available 
already. Instead, it had to be prepared for RFID testing and then the specifics of this 
paper. Future investigators are encouraged to collaborate with institutions of higher 
education that might already have space designated for this type of RF testing, or be 
planning the establishment of labs for such a purpose. Often this is not advertised outside 
the school, or even to other colleges on the same campus. 
 
 The capacitive switching model described in the Delimitations has in fact been 
prototyped, but could not be included in the testing here because its thickness was too 
great for use as an RFID card, and thus too large for the test system of the Methods. 
While it brings perhaps too much material to include in the same dissertation, this method 






fabrication facility could have been involved in the preparation of prototypes, there could 
have been included a comparison between the two card technologies, and illustrative 
examples of how they differ. For the time being, it must do that the proof of concept has 
been made. The overlay scheme used in it would only be given greater precision and 
flexibility in a capacitive system. More work done to miniaturize its components is 
desired. 
 
 More involvement from people is needed in order to make this RFID solution 
demonstrably relevant and effective in terms of a practical deployment. Matters as 
seemingly small as the feel and appearance of the overlays can have a major impact on 
results in the field. In line with the studies mentioned in the Literature Review, more is 
needed for interdisciplinary work here. Many questions about personal values, routine, 
and propriety can be answered only by those whose lives are affected by the technology 
change. Since every new device embodies a paradigm, it is important that users be 
observed and surveyed over a long term to see whether this paradigm is one in which 
they are comfortable. Trends shift according to factors that card engineering cannot 
address, such as media coverage of the topics, or prevailing government and regulatory 
stance. It would seem favorable to include research on human subjects in more ID work, 
which is after all directly relevant to personnel. Carrying and manipulating cards is a 
process much less invasive in a subject's life than many proposals that come before an 
institution review board. This factor is useful in securing approval for it, provided a direct 






5.3.2 Additional Laboratory Observations 
 
 Though separate from the observations following the Research Questions, these 
points were illustrated during the experiments, and seem salient enough to include: 
 
 Consistent with industry claims, the RFID card and reader performed with high 
reliability before overlay technology was introduced, exhibiting on average fewer 
than one read error per thousand attempts (over 99.9% reliability). 
 The general effectiveness of detuning conductors was visible immediately and 
strikingly throughout testing. Not a single error arose in the read blocking at any 
state of coverage over 50%, even after many thousands of iterations. 
 The effects of the aluminum tape were found to be temporary and completely 
reversible, having no lingering effect on the card between applications when 
tested for independence at 99% confidence. 
 
5.3.3 Exclusions and Limitations 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation is not to test all of the factors that make 
traditional plastic cards attractive, but to test the particular mechanism outlined. The other 
factors, though vital, are considered to have been adequately tested by the governing 
agencies that deployed them, and proven over many decades of public use. Adding RFID 
technology to cards of familiar composition and size eases the transition, which helps to 
explain why electronic cards are already used as national identification in Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Estonia, Finland, Belgium, Portugal, and Spain (Nogueira & Greis, 2009). 
 
 As this was a technological investigation, it did not offer testing of human factors. 
This remains a vital aspect of any successful deployment. With the model cards now 
available and shown to function as claimed, those inclined to conduct research on their 
usability would find a prime invitation. It would seem helpful if there could be studies in 






way, ease of data field selection using common tape and overlays, the indirect benefits of 
information separation, and so forth. New technologies cannot achieve widespread 
acceptance unless they are introduced at a time conducive to it, and in a cultural 
landscape where a great variety of people will find the solution preferable. At the least, it 
is needed that many real users are exposed to overlay selection cards and given a chance 





 Readers will note that in the course of this experiment, some findings have 
appeared that would have implications for those involved in management of an RFID 
deployment, and others that would have implications for those in research and 
development. Below are some of the things to keep in mind when taking the RFID 
solution of this dissertation out of the laboratory and into popular use, as well as the 
things that follow from the particular work done in this technology, in terms of its future 
research potential. 
 
5.4.1 Concerning Technology Deployments 
 
5.4.1.1 Uniquely Identifying People 
 
 RFID is used, in this context, for distinguishing documents such as cards, from a 
distance. It is not directly involved in distinguishing people. For that, some unique human 
factors would need to be measured and stored in the RFID card. This is the realm of 
biometrics, which is a separate but often connected discipline. For long, the photograph 
on the card along with simple details such as height and eye color have been used to tie 
the card to its bearer. It is of utmost importance that plans for an RFID-enabled personnel 
solution include at least as much effort. If it becomes possible for another party to 






chapters may be disabled by him just as readily as by the legitimate owner. If the 
biometric factors do not uniquely and exclusively tie the card to its owner, then it may 
become possible for others to use the card for impersonation. As discussed in the 
delimitations, such matters are beyond the scope of this dissertation. They nonetheless 
must be recognized and dealt with if its findings are to be applied practically. 
 
5.4.1.2 Large-Scale Applications 
 
 Any RFID technology for personnel requires the backing of legislation if it is to 
be deployed on the scale of a state or country. Though policy issues form another matter 
beyond scope, these conclusions and recommendations might still serve to prepare those 
who wish to propose or defend policy changes. RFID-enabled driver's license cards are 
already in use in several states (DMV.org, 2015) and card field selection by means of 
overlays has been shown to work well (Clement et al., 2012). The discussion might now 
move toward tailoring the prototype card of this dissertation to the exact specifications 
required for the state or national entity that would use it. Those involved in the design 
and production of such technologies could be bolstered greatly by the support of 
legislative bodies that commit to the use of their results. 
 
 Among the primary specifications to be made there is the number of fields needed 
for a specific deployment. This will affect the number of switching regions into which the 
card space will be divided, and thus the size of each region. Manufacturers such as 
Murata have produced antennas as small as 3.2mm²--small enough to fit inside the "d" of 
an Indiana state driver's license, and clearly smaller than any card region a user would 
need to cover (Swedberg, 2012). Its .7mm thickness is less than the 1mm maximum listed 
above in Design Factors as well, so there is no apparent technological barrier to resizing 
the model fields accordingly. This is simply one of the factors that planners will need to 







 The trend of replacing a printed card with an electronic card as the driver's license 
has expanded steadily, not only in the United States, but worldwide. It has included, 
among others, El Salvador in the late 1990s, several states of India in 2003, Japan in 2007, 
Morocco in 2007, Mexico in 2007, Indonesia in 2009, Australia in 2010, Croatia in 2013, 
France in 2013, and Ireland in 2013. Several of these such as Japan, Morocco, and 
Indonesia were RFID-enabled cards (Stoltz, 2014). Above in the Literature Review, 
"enhanced" driver's license cards were discussed. RFID is considered a fundamental 
technology for these cards (U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 2014). At the time when 
this section was written, the states of Washington, Vermont, New York, and Michigan 
had fully implemented EDL cards. Arizona and Texas were in progress (DMV.org, 2015). 
It is strongly recommended that interested parties in these states consider how selection 
mechanisms will figure in the future of such cards. 
 
5.4.1.3 Ramifications of a Detuning Approach 
 
 Those planning to propose a deployment based on the findings here might wish to 
mention some of the facts that make it especially attractive: 
 
 The presented shielding method works even on RFID cards have no die, such as 
those commonly used for electronic article surveillance in stores, etc. The 
8.2MHz LC tank circuit sticker used for loss prevention is a good example. 
 The foil works on either side of the card, so it's possible to obscure the RFID 
replies (by taping the back of the card), while leaving the front visible. 
 The foil prevents not only read operations, but also write operations, protecting 
the user against attempts to alter or destroy card data. 
 
 To ease the transition to a detunable card, users should be assured that it presents 
no drastic change in usability. Its look, feel, and performance make it resemble one of the 
existing RFID-enabled driver's license cards. Those that would prefer to use it as such are 






Those that wish to use the selection feature, though, will be able to do so in much the 
same way they did with the old print cards. The only difference is that instead of 
selecting a visibly opaque tape for cover, they will be selecting an electromagnetically 
opaque tape (or tape alternative overlay such as film, sleeve, bar, etc.) Common 
aluminum tape is sold near masking tape in hardware stores across the country. No 
sophisticated electronic accessories are needed to enable the feature. 
 
 User education will be of importance here, as it is not possible for the card to 
discern the will of those holding it. It will need to be established early that there is a 
difference in selectivity between keeping the card in an enclosed sleeve (which renders it 
completely unreadable until removed), and obscuring only particular regions of the card 
(which renders only those regions unreadable). All the usual warnings concerning 
electro-static discharge, extreme temperatures, and strong magnetic fields will need to be 
included when the card is introduced. This will not be difficult, as it is nearly identical to 
the warnings for common chip-and-PIN smart cards issued for credit and debit, etc. 
Finally, it is advisable to remind the user that because the print and the RF emissions of 
the card are not drawn from one common data store, there does exist the possibility that, 
in the case of accident or tampering, they might disagree. As the magnetic stripe of a card 
must be verified against its print, so must the RFID output against its print, and against 
any other means of storing the data in such a card (recall earlier caveats from Inviting the 






5.4.2 Concerning Research and Development 
 
 Perhaps the most important recommendation to other researchers is that they take 
the results of this work into experiments involving practical users in realistic 
environments. This could be an excellent opportunity for specialists in the humanities to 
prepare work similar to what Clement et al. did in their 2012 study of identification cards. 
Events such as conferences and workshops provide ready groups of attendants who 
would be issued identification cards anyway. Such cards could be modified for selective 
detuning, and developments during the event deliberately chosen as an incentive to users 
for selection. These attendants could later be surveyed on the experience, to evaluate their 
acceptance of the model and any usability concerns that might have arisen. 
 
 College campuses are another inviting test bed for ID card technologies. Many 
have huge student, staff, and faculty populations who will be attending the institution on 
the order of years, making a longitudinal study more practical. Questions of how the card 
might wear over time could be answered empirically by following marked users over 
time. Questions of whether users understand the value of the personal data selection 
could be answered by brief and regular online surveys. Playful contests might be 
introduced as an incentive for the user to apply the selection mechanism to prevent mock 
antagonists from tracking their activity or obtaining their private data. Those who manage 
to stay safe while still passing legitimate transactional data (such as student ID number, 
etc.) might become eligible for gift drawings, etc. Those "victims" whose private data are 
successfully "stolen" might receive an e-mail message warning them about the threat of 
real antagonists and fraud. 
 
 As mentioned often in this paper, the public has had an ambivalent relationship 
with RFID, wary of it even as they show interest in its offerings. Some privacy experts 







Research indicates consumers are willing to make certain tradeoffs of their 
privacy for benefits such as convenience... but individuals want to know when 
there is a potential that their privacy might be at risk, and they want to retain 
control of the choice to change that level of risk. (Schenke, 2010). 
 
 If users are to be trusted in accepting and using a system as designed, inspiring 
their confidence in it is of tremendous importance, regardless of whether the anticipated 
problems manifest. The state of California, for instance, had planned to roll out a new 
driver's license card in kind with Arizona and Texas, but in 2013 suspended legislation to 
put RFID technology in it due to complaints from privacy groups (Kravets, 2013). This is 
where technology ambassadors have a chance to resolve such conflict in other states and 
countries. 
 
 The method described here places the privacy tool in the users' hands, which not 
only helps the issuing entity illustrate its commitment to user protection, but also might 
help reduce its liability. More attention from researchers in fields such as Communication, 
Sociology and Anthropology is highly recommended, as there appear to be many 
opportunities for study of changing attitudes surrounding this technology. 
 
 While the testing reported here dealt with a hardware-level solution that is usable 
even with passive RFID device, a small step from it takes related research into smart card 
technology, and the prospect of using the conductive overlays as a means of directly 
manipulating the settings of an onboard computer. The earlier discussion of capacitive 
switching outlines how this would become possible. To the user, the use of overlays 
would be no different, but would control a larger set of possible functions, including 







5.4.2.1 Linking Data Fields 
 
 It is not necessary, with this model, to use only one card per user. Multiple cards 
may be produced, linking any of desired fields of the user's record, and excluding from a 
particular card's storage all other fields. Data set relations is a separate topic, but deserves 
brief mention here. It is important in cases where a card would be physically passed, and 
the privacy overlay could be removed. For example, in contexts needing age verification 
or name verification, this could allow it even at the high speed of RFID processing, 
without risk that additional information be obtained by manipulating the card. The 
detuning approach cooperates with a variety of data isolation strategies at the hardware 
level, and so system architects planning for a deployment would do well to consider 
exactly which data fields are desirable for which cards, and in which contexts. 
 
 The discussion of wireless cards for identification is not complete without a 
discussion of the databases against which the card data are to be compared. In such a 
system, it must be clearly delineated which data should reside on the card and which 
should reside in the database, related to the card by some unique identifier. In 
deployments involving drivers' license cards over the past two decades, it has been 
common for the RFID component to release only the unique identifier. A computer 
network relates this identifier to as many user fields as desired. Database management is 
beyond the scope of the discussion here, but it must be taken into account for a practical 
case, as cards that provide individual field selection call for a different engineering 
philosophy than is currently in use. 
 
 RFID-enabled driver's license cards from Washington, to cite one representative 
example, are used to poll a central database of biometric data (Washington State 
Department of Licensing, 2015). Without this, the wireless feature of the card is not 
complete as a form of personal identification. It is really only self-identification of the 
card. Exploring how many fields belong in the database and on the card, as well as how 






solution presented above provides a means to select and disclose such keys, but without 
the cooperation of those entities that control the database, the purpose of the overlays 
could be neglected during implementation. 
 
5.4.2.2 Other Prospects 
 
Some suggestions for further research in overlay selection technology include 
 
 Adding to RFID the type of challenge/response interactions popular in encrypted 
smart cards. This could unite the technology of both nicely, but give the user the 
ability to control its operation with overlays. 
 Experimenting with fields specifically shaped for pinching with a fingertip. 
Above it was discussed how pinch switches can be quite handy to enable reading 
of a card that is handled often (Huber, 2012). Mechanical switches are thick and 
prone to damage, but surface capacitor plates that sense the proximity of a finger 
may be as thin as the card. 
 Using capacitive pads to allow user selection of PINs and such. Ordinarily, such 
cards are programmed with an external unit, but if several configurations were 
known to be useful in the future, they could all be programmed, and the user 











 A novel RFID card design has been introduced to provide a data selection 
function through the use of conductive overlays. The mechanism undergirding it has been 
validated through laboratory tests and shown highly reliable. Its effects are temporary and 
reversible, requiring no external electronics to perform selection. Users interact with it 
through familiar, intuitive methods. Its composition and dimensions are as familiar as in 
existing cards, allowing it to be carried in the same fashion. This is important, as many 
civil functions call for personnel identification, and the license-sized plastic card has 
become an unofficial standard form of ID. Radiofrequency identification has been used 
with increasing popularity in this and many other identity documents. The user can retain 
discretion over whether the wireless communication features of the card are enabled, and 
for which fields. It is a technology platform suitable for innovation. 
 
 The model design offers distinct advantages over existing RFID deployments for 
personnel identification. It extends the functionality of traditional printed cards and 
empowers the user to better limit unauthorized disclosure of personal data. Granular 
selection of card data fields is possible with this design, which was not possible with the 
RFID cards that preceded it. This brings the prospect of technologies to follow, and 
implementation at the large community level. Many of the concerns that have held back 
other identification initiatives have been addressed here, with explanations of how the 
new design could bring remedy. A detailed explanation of the experiments was given, as 
an invitation to others that might perform related testing. Several opportunities for further 


























Abdullah, A.K. (2004, October 8). Protecting Your Good Name: Identity Theft and its 
 Prevention. Proceedings of the 1st Annual Conference on Information Security 
 Curriculum Development, pp. 102-106. Retrieved from 
 http://dl.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?id=1059547 
 
Albrecht, K. (2008, August 21). How RFID tags could be used to track  
 unsuspecting people. Scientific American. Retrieved from 
 http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-rfid-tags-could-be-used 
 
Amer, S.H. & Hamilton, J.A. (2008, April 14). Understanding Security Architecture. 
 Proceedings of the 2008 Spring Simulation Multiconference, pp. 335-342. 
 Retrieved from 
 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1400596 
 
American Civil Liberties Union. (December, 2007). Washington State Enhanced Driver’s 
 Licenses vs. U.S. Passports - Radio Frequency Emitting IDs and Your Privacy. 
 Retrieved from 
 https://www.aclu-wa.org/sites/default/files/attachments/EDLvPassport_12_07.pdf 
 
Authoritative Dictionary of IEEE Standards Terms, Seventh Edition. (2007). Institute of 
 Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Retrieved from 
 http://ieeexplore.ieee.org//xpls/abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4116787 
 
Backes, G., Becker, R. C., & Cornett, A. (2014). U.S. Patent No. 8,763,893. Washington, 
 DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
Bidinosti, C. P. & Hayden, M. E. (2008, October 29). Selective Passive Shielding and the 
 Faraday Bracelet. Applied Physics Letters, vol. 93 (174102). Retrieved from 
 http://link.aip.org/link/doi/10.1063/1.2998607 
 
Bouchard, O. (2014). U.S. Patent No. 8,746,575. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Bove, J. M. (2012). U.S. Patent No. 8,111,160. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 







Brazy, D. (2010, May 4). Ariz. College to Position Sensors to Check Class Attendance. 
 The Badger Herald. Retrieved from 
 http://badgerherald.com/news/2010/05/04/ariz_college_to_posi.php 
 
Brookes, T. (2010). RFID and Privacy. UK RFID. Retrieved from 
 http://ukrfid.innoware.co.uk/rfid_systems/rfid_privacy 
 
Clement, A., McPhail, B., Smith, K.L., & Ferenbok, J. (2012, August 12). Probing, 
 Mocking and Prototyping: Participatory approaches to identity infrastructuring 
 Proceedings of the 12th Participatory Design Conference: Research Papers - 
 vol. 1, pp. 21-30. Retrieved from 
 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2347639 
 
Coiro Sr., M. A., Miller, S. J., & Schupsky, T. (2012). U.S. Patent No. 8,161,910. 
 Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
Cook, D., Dixon, P., Duckworth, W. M., Kaiser, M. S., Koehler, K., Meeker, W. Q., & 
 Stephenson, W. R. (2001, February 7). 
 Binary Response and Logistic Regression Analysis. Iowa State University 




Cram, Douglas. (2014). RFID Technologies - RFID 101 [Flexible RFID card antenna 
 inlay illustration]. Retrieved from 
 http://www.tresrfsolutions.com/AFA_RFID101.pptx 
 




Douglass, M. (2006). U.S. Patent No. 7,004,385. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Douglass, M. (2007). U.S. Patent No. 7,284,692. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Douglass, M. (2009). U.S. Patent No. 7,584,885. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Galloway, J. (2010, April 19). Delusions, The Legislature and an Implanted Microchip. 









Garfinkel, S.L., Juels, A., & Pappu, R. (2005). RFID privacy: 
 an overview of problems and proposed solutions. IEEE Security & Privacy, 3(3). 
 Retrieved from 
 http://simson.net/clips/academic/2005.IEEE.RFID.pdf 
 
Gertz, B. (2008, March 26). Outsourced Passports Netting Govt. Profits, Risking 




Glossary of Common Cybersecurity Terminology. (n.d.). National Initiative for 
 Cybersecurity Careers and Studies. Retrieved April 3, 2014, from 
 http://niccs.us- cert.gov/glossary 
 
Glossary of RFID Terms. (2014). RFID Journal. Retrieved from 
 http://www.rfidjournal.com/site/glossary-of-terms 
 
Greenblatt, A. (2010, April 15). Lawmakers Are Working on Anti-Brain-Chip Bill. 




Gregorio, J. (2009, November 27). CCD. Retrieved from 
 http://bitworking.org/news/2009/11/ccd 
 
GS1 EPCglobal. (2013). EPC Tag Data Standard 1.7. Retrieved from 
 http://www.gs1.org/gsmp/kc/epcglobal/tds 
 
GS1.EPCglobal Gen2. (2013). EPC Radio-Frequency Identity Protocols Generation-2 
 UHF RFID. Retrieved from 
 http://www.gs1.org/gsmp/kc/epcglobal/uhfc1g2 
 
Haddock, R. M. (2014). U.S. Patent No. 8,820,639. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Hammerschmidt, C. (2008, April 1). NXP RFID encryption cracked. EE Times. 




Hardgrave, B. C. & Miller, R. (2006, February). The Myths and Realities of RFID. 
 Information Technology Research Institute, University of Arkansas. 
 Retrieved from 






Heim, K. (2008, March 31). UW Team Researches a Future Filled with RFID Chips. 
 The Seattle Times. Retrieved from 
 http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/2004316708_rfid31.html 
 
Herrmann, S. (Ed.). (2007, May 25). Wi-fi and RFID used for tracking. BBC News. 
 Retrieved from 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/technology/6691139.stm 
 
HID Global Corporation. (2014). [Product description of 293/296 SIO Solution for 
 MIFARE DESFire EV1 + LEGIC prime 1024]. Retrieved from 
 http://www.hidglobal.com/products/cards-and-credentials/legic/legic-prime-1024 
 
HID Global Corporation. (2014). [13.56MHz physical card characteristics]. 
 Retrieved from 
 http://www.hidglobal.com/sites/hidglobal.com/files/resource_files/d00529-e.5-
 13.56- mhz-physical-access-htog-en_1.pdf 
 
Huber, B. R. (2012, February 17). No more virtual pickpocketing of credit cards, 
 thanks to new tap and pay technology. University of Pittsburgh EurekAlert. 
 Retrieved from 
 http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2012-02/uop-nmv021712.php 
 
Hutzler, R., Nguyen, S. N., Smith IV, N. J., & Zimmerman, T. G. (2014). U.S. Patent No. 
 8,823,497. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
ISO/IEC 15693. (2010). Identification Cards - Contactless Integrated Circuit Cards - 




ISO/IEC 14443. (2008). Identification Cards - Contactless Integrated Circuit Cards - 




Jei, D. G. & Lee, Y. H. (2008). U.S. Patent No. 7,374,100. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent 
 and Trademark Office. 
 
Johnson, R. C. (2008, May 14). Testbed Streamlines RFID Development. EE Times. 




Jones, M. H. (2014). U.S. Patent No. 8,777,727. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 






Juels, A., Rivest, R. L., & Szydlo, M. (2003, October 27). The Blocker Tag: Selective 
 Blocking of RFID Tags for Consumer Privacy. In V. Atluri, ed. Proceedings of 
 the 8th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 103-
 111. Retrieved from 
 http://www.emc.com/emc-plus/rsa-labs/staff-associates/the-blocker-tag.htm 
 
Kargl, W. & Sbuell, R. (2011). U.S. Patent No. 7,912,430. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent 
 and Trademark Office. 
 
Karjoth, G., & Moskowitz, P.A. (2005, November 7). Disabling RFID Tags with Visible 
 Confirmation: Clipped Tags Are Silenced. Proceedings of the 2005 ACM 
 Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, pp. 27-30. Retrieved from 
 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1102205 
 
Kim, W. K. (2011) U.S. Patent No. 7,909,258. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Kim, M. J. (2014). U.S. Patent No. 8,816,819. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Koh, W. H. & Ho, J. (2009). U.S. Patent No. 7,564,359. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent 
 and Trademark Office. 
 
Koscher, K., Juels, A., Kohno, T., & Brajkovic, V. (2009, November 9). EPC RFID Tags 
 in Security Applications: Passport Cards, Enhanced Drivers Licenses, and Beyond. 
 Proceedings of the 16th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications 
 Security, pp. 33-42. Retrieved from 
 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1653668 
 
Koyama, J. (2010). U.S. Patent No. 7,663,473. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Koyama, J. (2010). U.S. Patent No. 7,666,722. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Koyama, J., Abe, H., Yukawa, M., Iwaki, Y., & Yamazaki, S. (2010) U.S. Patent No. 
 7,795,617. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
Kravets, D. (2013, September 3). California Abruptly Drops Plan to Implant RFID Chips 








Krisch, A. (2007, December 5). RFID usage and informed consent - Using and removing 
 of RFID functionality. European Digital Rights Papers. 
 Retrieved from 
 http://www.edri.org/docs/EDRi_RFID_Informed_Consent_published.pdf 
 
Kunkle, F., & Helderman, R. S. (2010, February 10). Human microchips seen by some 
 in Virginia House as device of antichrist. An issue of privacy 




Lawson, S. (2008, October 24). Researchers find Problems with RFID Passport Cards. 




Lehman, S. (2012, March 22). Brazilian City Uses Computer Chips Embedded in School 




Lewan, T. (2009, July 12). Special alloy sleeves urged to block hackers? 




Lewan, T. (2009, July 11). Chips in official IDs raise privacy fears. Phys.org. 
 Retrieved from 
 http://phys.org/news166552331.html 
 
Liao, D. & Edelson, S. D. (2010). U.S. Patent No. 7,784,693. Washington, DC: U.S. 
 Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
Lim, T.L. & Li, T. (2008, March 31). Flexible Privacy Protection for RFID Tags via 
 Selective Identifier Masking. Proceedings of the IEEE Wireless Communications 
 and Networking Conference, pp. 1570-1575. Retrieved from 
 http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/4489030/4489031/04489312.pdf 
 
Lindley, S. E. (2013). U.S. Patent No. D690,767. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Lowe, P. R. (2009). U.S. Patent No. 7,523,870. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 







Mahmood, R. A., & Al-Hamdani, W.A. (2011, October 7). Is RFID Technology Secure 
 and Private? Proceedings of the 2011 Information Security Curriculum 
 Development Conference, pp. 42-49. Retrieved from 
 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2047462 
 
Maniyan, A., Ghassemi, R. A., & Rahrovy, E. (2012). A survey of the Role and the 
 Applications of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) Technology in the 
 Efficiency of Supply Chain Management (SCM) with an emphasis on Food 
 Industries. International Journal of Learning & Development. vol. 2, no. 5. 
 Retrieved from 
 http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/ijld/article/viewFile/2299/2020 
 
Marquardt, N., Taylor, A.S., Villar, N., & Greenberg, S. (2010, April 10). Rethinking 
 RFID: Awareness and Control for Interaction with RFID Systems. Proceedings of 
 the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp. 2307-2316. 
 Retrieved from 
 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1753674 
 
Marquardt, N., Taylor, A.S., Villar, N., & Greenberg, S. (2010, April 10). Visible and 
 Controllable RFID Tags. Proceedings of CHI EA '10 CHI '10 Extended 
 Abstracts on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp. 3057-3062. 
 Retrieved from 
 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1753917 
 
Masuta, T. (2008). U.S. Patent No. 7,387,233. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Maus, C. T. (2011). U.S. Patent No. 8,066,192. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Maus, C. T. (2014). U.S. Patent No. 8,800,877. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
McNamara, P. (2009, April 8). Mich. lawmaker urges governor to rethink RFID 
 in licenses. Network World. Retrieved from 
 http://www.networkworld.com/community/node/40717 
 
Metras, H. (2005, October 12). RFID Tags for Ambient Intelligence: Present Solutions 
 and Future Challenges. Proceedings of the 2005 joint conference on Smart objects 
 and ambient intelligence: innovative context-aware services: usages and 
 technologies, pp 43-46. Retrieved from 
 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1107565 
 
Narendra, S. G., Tadepalli, P., & Chakraborty, S. (2011). U.S. Patent No. 7,961,101. 






Nogueira, M. & Greis, N. (December, 2009). Uses of RFID Technology in U.S. 




O'Byrne, H. D., Smith, S. W., & Pauley, J. D. (2011). U.S Patent No. 7,932,813. 
 Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
Ohkawa, T., Yuyama, M., Yoshigi, H., Oonishi, T., & Watanabe, K. (2005). U.S. Patent 
 No. 6,972,662. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
Periaswamy, S. C. G., Thompson, D. R., & Di, J. (2011). Fingerprinting RFID Tags. 
 IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing. vol. 8, no. 6. 




Philips Semiconductors. (2002). mifare® (14443A) 13.56 MHz RFID Proximity 
 Antennas [Data file]. Public Revision 1.0. Retrieved from 
 http://www.nxp.com/documents/application_note/AN78010.pdf 
 
Phillips, T., Karygiannis, T., & Kuhn, R. (2005, December 12). Security Standards for 
 the RFID Market. IEEE Security & Privacy. Retrieved from 
 http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/8013/33104/01556544.pdf 
 
Qaiser, A., & Khan, S. (2006, November 13). Automation of Time and Attendance using 
 RFID Systems. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Emerging 
 Technologies, pp.60-63. Retrieved from 
 http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/4136870/4117909/04136896.pdf 
 
Qiao, Y., Chen, S., & Li, T. (2013). RFID as an Infrastructure. Springer Briefs in 
 Computer Science. Retrieved from 
 https://www.springer.com/engineering/electronics/book/978-1-4614-5229-4 
 
Ramos, A., Scott, W., Lloyd, D., O'Leary, K., & Waldo, J. (2009, October 1). A Threat 
 Analysis of RFID Passports. Communications of the ACM, vol. 52, no. 12, 
 pp. 38-42. Retrieved from 
 http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=1626175 
 
Rau, C. C., & Hsaio, C. S. (2012, August 24). Constructing a Security-Mechanism RFID 
 System. Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Anti-Counterfeiting, 








RFID Glossary. (n.d.). Alliance Group Document & Records Management. 
 Retrieved April 3, 2014, from 
 http://www.alliancegroup.co.uk/rfid-glossary.htm 
 
Rieback, M. R., Gaydadjiev, G. N., Crispo, B., Hofman, R. F. H., & Tanenbaum, A. S. 
 (2006, December 3). A Platform for RFID Security and Privacy Administration. 
 20th Large Installation System Administration Conference. Retrieved from 
 http://www.usenix.org/event/lisa06/tech/rieback/rieback.pdf 
 
Roberti, M. (2009, August 10). Are RFID's Benefits to Apparel Retailers Real or Hype? 
 RFID Journal. Retrieved from 
 http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?5112 
 
Schneier, B. (2008, January 21). Information is our only security weapon. 
 (S. Stokely, Ed.). Keynote address at Linux Australia Conference. Retrieved from 
 http://www.schneier.com/news-051.html 
 
Selker, E. J. (2005). U.S. Patent No. 6,863,220. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Shahzad, M. & Liu, A. X. (2012, August 22). Every Bit Counts - Fast and Scalable 
 RFID Estimation. Proceedings of ACM MobiCom’12 Conference, pp. 365-376. 




Shaughnessy, M. (2010, March 3). Labeling the Consumer: how mindless ID-scanning 
 can hurt customers. BoingBoing. Retrieved from 
 http://boingboing.net/2010/03/03/labeling-the-consume.html 
 
Shimizu, M., Takenaka, H., & Tanaka, S. (2000). U.S. Patent No. 6,097,622. Washington, 
 DC: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
 
Smith, M. (2010, July 27). The Next Big Privacy Concern: RFID "Spychips". 




Smith, S.W. & Spafford, E.H. (2004, February 19). Grand Challenges in Information 








Stoltz, M. (2014, June). Electronic driver’s licenses: Driving towards the future. 
 Whitepaper for NXP Semiconductors. Retrieved from 
 http://www.nxp.com/documents/white_paper/75017570.pdf 
 
Suzuki, H. (2008). U.S. Patent No. 7,439,781. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Swedberg, C. (2012, October 11). Murata Mass-Produces 'World's Smallest HF Tag'. 
 RFID Journal. Retrieved from 
 http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?10017 
 
Sweeney, W. R. (2014). U.S. Patent No. 8,624,740. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Tanner, C. (2010). U.S. Patent No. 7,762,471. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Timmer, J. (2008, October 2). RFID passport hack has scanner seeing visions of Elvis. 




United States Census Bureau. (2013). [National population statistics]. Retrieved from 
 http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html 
 
U.S. Customs and Border Protecton. (2014, March 26). Info Center. What is an Enhanced 
 Driver's License (EDL). Retrieved from 
 https://help.cbp.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/1269/ 
 
Want, R. (2004, October 1). The Magic of RFID. ACM Queue, vol. 2, no. 7. 
 Retrieved from 
 http://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=1035619 
 
Washington State Department of Licensing. (2015). Frequently asked questions: 
 EDL/EID. Retrieved from 
 http://www.dol.wa.gov/driverslicense/edlfaq.html 
 
Williams, I. (2009, April 15). South Africa rolls out biometric passports. Incisive Media. 
 Retrieved from 






Xiang-jie, N. & Hua, L. (2014, March 10). Lower Power Design for UHF RF CMOS 
 Circuits Based on the Power Consumption Acuity. Mathematical Problems in 
 Engineering. Retrieved from 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/512398 
 
Yuengling, J. (2009). U.S. Patent No. D597,307. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Yuengling, J. (2011). U.S. Patent No. D635,359. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 
 Trademark Office. 
 
Zuili, P. J. (2013). U.S. Patent No. 8,397,988. Washington, DC: U.S. Patent and 



























These are details of the search through existing Patent applications for prior work similar 
to that proposed for this dissertation. 
 
The text and illustrations were read for every patent since 1976 the title of which 
contained the terms "RFID" and "card". A total of 35 patents were reviewed: 
 
Secure data card with passive RFID chip and biometric sensor 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,823,497, 2014) 
 
Security feature RFID card 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,820,639, 2014) 
 
Dynamic information radio-frequency identification (RFID) card with biometric 
capabilities 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,816,819, 2014) 
 
RFID reporting personal health card and related systems 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,800,877, 2014) 
 
Turbo card table game with RFID card identifier 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,777,727, 2014) 
 
Switchable RFID card reader antenna 






Semi-rigid radio frequency identification (RFID) card, manufacturing method and 
machine for its production 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,746,575, 2014) 
 
Controllable RFID card 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,624,740, 2014) 
 
RFID clamshell style card 
(U.S. Patent No. D690, 767, 2013) 
 
Method and system for securing a transaction using a card generator, a RFID generator, 
and a challenge response protocol 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,397,988, 2013) 
 
Integrated RFID tag in a card holder, cage, lid, and rack for use with inventorying and 
tracking of cage occupants and equipment 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,161,910, 2012) 
 
Light enabled RFID card 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,111,160, 2012) 
 
RFID reporting personal health card and related systems 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,066,192, 2011) 
 
Small RFID card with integrated inductive element 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,961,101, 2011) 
 
Sampling to obtain signal from RFID card 







Silicone card frame with RFID payment device 
(U.S. Patent No. D635, 359, 2011) 
 
Circuit arrangement for wirelessly exchanging data and RFID chip card device 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,912,430, 2011) 
 
RFID card using Korea paper and the manufacturing method thereof 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,909,258, 2011) 
 
Semiconductor device, IC card, IC tag, RFID, transponder, paper money, valuable 
securities, passport, electronic device, bag, and clothes 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,795,617, 2010) 
 
Assembly of SIM card and RFID antenna 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,784,693, 2010) 
 
Proximity payment card with cost-effective connection between user-actuatable input 
switch and RFID IC 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,762,471, 2010) 
 
Manufacturing method of semiconductor device, and IC card, IC tag, RFID, transponder, 
bill, securities, passport, electronic apparatus, bag, and garment 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,666,722, 2010) 
 
Semiconductor device, IC card, IC tag, RFID, transponder, bills, securities, passport, 
electronic apparatus, bag, and clothes 








Currency dispensing ATM with RFID card reader 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,584,885, 2009) 
 
Silicone card frame clip with RFID payment device 
(U.S. Patent No. D597, 307, 2009) 
 
Memory module and card with integrated RFID tag 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,564,359, 2009) 
 
RFID card retention assembly 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,523,870, 2009) 
 
Power detection circuit for non-contact IC card or RFID tag 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,439,781, 2008) 
 
RFID card issuing system 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,387,233, 2008) 
 
Mobile terminal having smart card coupled with RFID tag and method for  performing 
RFID function in such mobile terminal 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,374,100, 2008) 
 
ATM with RFID card, note, and check reading capabilities 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,284,692, 2007) 
 
Currency dispensing ATM with RFID card reader 








RFID (radio frequency identification) and IC card 
(U.S. Patent No. 6,972,662, 2005) 
 
Manually operated switch for enabling and disabling an RFID card 
(U.S. Patent No. 6,863,220, 2005) 
 
Ferroelectric memory used for the RFID system, method for driving the  same, 
semiconductor chip and ID card 
(U.S. Patent No. 6,097,622, 2000) 
 
 None of these patents incorporate the multiple-region card nor the selective 
detuning method described in this dissertation. The nearest in concept were 8,624,740 
(2014); 7,762,471 (2010); and 6,863,220 (2005); which involved switchable functions, 
but no antenna overlay. Of these, the closest prior work was probably 6,863,220, as it 
does mention capacitive coupling. What sets it apart, though, is that it calls for an 
external key device to enable data transfer, rather than the conductive overlay to disable it 
(2005). 
 
 Patents were also searched with the additional strings "select", "cover", "overlay", 
"field", and "privacy" (individually appended). No matching patents were found. With 
"security", one patent was found: 
 
Security feature RFID card 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,820,639, 2014) 









With "data", two more were found: 
 
Secure data card with passive RFID chip and biometric sensor 
(U.S. Patent No. 8,823,497, 2014) 
This deals with biometrics rather than RF selection (2014). 
 
Circuit arrangement for wirelessly exchanging data and RFID chip card device 
(U.S. Patent No. 7,912,430, 2011) 
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